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Better immigration: Prisoner’s dilemma game with population change on dynamic network

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  • Wu, Jiadong
  • Zhao, Chengye

Abstract

We investigate immigration issues in terms of the prisoner’s dilemma game with population change on a dynamic network. We propose a relationship updating phase considering individuals’ irrational behavior to demonstrate the dynamics of the game relationship network. Compared with the static network, immigration effectiveness on the dynamic network is significantly improved. By analyzing the influence of immigration volume, it is found that too many immigrants into society together would reduce the immigration effectiveness. However, batch-based immigration can make it insensitive to the volume at the cost of lengthening the time it takes for society to reach equilibrium again after immigration. Detailed simulations reveal that the cooperation level of immigrants can hardly threaten the survival of natives but is the key to immigrants, while the immigrants with abundant relationships do. Besides, the immigration effectiveness is also determined by the temptation to defect, the minimum requirements in society, the death probability, the probability of relationship updating mode and the game experience in terms of regression analysis. In addition, the stability of dynamic society towards immigration events has been demonstrated by analysis of variance.

Suggested Citation

  • Wu, Jiadong & Zhao, Chengye, 2020. "Better immigration: Prisoner’s dilemma game with population change on dynamic network," Physica A: Statistical Mechanics and its Applications, Elsevier, vol. 556(C).
    • Handle: RePEc:eee:phsmap:v:556:y:2020:i:c:s037843712030340x
    DOI: 10.1016/j.physa.2020.124692
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    References listed on IDEAS

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    Cited by:

    1. Beranek, L. & Remes, R., 2023. "The emergence of a core–periphery structure in evolving multilayer network," Physica A: Statistical Mechanics and its Applications, Elsevier, vol. 612(C).

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