IDEAS home Printed from https://ideas.repec.org/p/fem/femwpa/2010.49.html
   My bibliography  Save this paper

(Anti-) Coordination in Networks

Author

Listed:
  • Jaromir Kovarik

    (University of the Basque Country)

  • Friederike Mengel

    (Maastricht University)

  • José Gabriel Romero

    (University of Santiago de Chile)

Abstract

We study (anti-) coordination problems in networks in a laboratory experiment. Partici- pants interact with their neighbours in a fixed network to play a bilateral (anti-) coordination game. Our main treatment variable is the extent to which players are heterogeneous in the number of connections (neighbors) they have. Other network characteristics are held constant across treatments. We find the following results. Heterogeneity in the number of connections dramatically improves the rate of successful coordination. In addition, even though there is a multiplicity of Nash equilibria theoretically, a very sharp selection is observed empirically: the most connected player can impose her preferred Nash equilibrium almost always and observed Nash equilibria are such that all links are coordinated. As a second treatment variation we let agents decide endogenously on the amount of information they would like to have and find that local (endogenous) information is equally efficient in ensuring successful coordination as full information. We provide an intuitive explanation of these facts which is supported by our data.

Suggested Citation

  • Jaromir Kovarik & Friederike Mengel & José Gabriel Romero, 2010. "(Anti-) Coordination in Networks," Working Papers 2010.49, Fondazione Eni Enrico Mattei.
  • Handle: RePEc:fem:femwpa:2010.49
    as

    Download full text from publisher

    File URL: http://www.feem.it/userfiles/attach/20104161118134NDL2010-049.pdf
    Download Restriction: no

    Other versions of this item:

    References listed on IDEAS

    as
    1. Charness, Gary & Corominas-Bosch, Margarida & Frechette, Guillaume R., 2007. "Bargaining and network structure: An experiment," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 136(1), pages 28-65, September.
    2. Kosfeld Michael, 2004. "Economic Networks in the Laboratory: A Survey," Review of Network Economics, De Gruyter, vol. 3(1), pages 1-23, March.
    3. Corbae, Dean & Duffy, John, 2008. "Experiments with network formation," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 64(1), pages 81-120, September.
    4. Andrea Galeotti & Sanjeev Goyal, 2009. "Influencing the influencers: a theory of strategic diffusion," RAND Journal of Economics, RAND Corporation, vol. 40(3), pages 509-532.
    5. Jackson, Matthew O. & Watts, Alison, 2002. "On the formation of interaction networks in social coordination games," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 41(2), pages 265-291, November.
    6. Cassar, Alessandra, 2007. "Coordination and cooperation in local, random and small world networks: Experimental evidence," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 58(2), pages 209-230, February.
    7. Katz, Michael L & Shapiro, Carl, 1986. "Technology Adoption in the Presence of Network Externalities," Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, vol. 94(4), pages 822-841, August.
    8. Choi, Syngjoo & Gale, Douglas & Kariv, Shachar & Palfrey, Thomas, 2011. "Network architecture, salience and coordination," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 73(1), pages 76-90, September.
    9. Goyal, Sanjeev & Vega-Redondo, Fernando, 2005. "Network formation and social coordination," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 50(2), pages 178-207, February.
    10. Kene BOUN MY & Marc WILLINGER & Anthony ZIEGELMEYER, 1999. "Global versus local interaction in coordination games: an experimental investigation," Working Papers of BETA 9923, Bureau d'Economie Théorique et Appliquée, UDS, Strasbourg.
    11. Syngjoo Choi & Jihong Lee, 2014. "Communication, Coordination, And Networks," Journal of the European Economic Association, European Economic Association, vol. 12(1), pages 223-247, February.
    12. repec:bpj:rneart:v:3:y:2004:i:1:p:19-41 is not listed on IDEAS
    13. Alós-Ferrer, Carlos & Weidenholzer, Simon, 2008. "Contagion and efficiency," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 143(1), pages 251-274, November.
    14. Hojman, Daniel A. & Szeidl, Adam, 2006. "Endogenous networks, social games, and evolution," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 55(1), pages 112-130, April.
    15. Urs Fischbacher, 2007. "z-Tree: Zurich toolbox for ready-made economic experiments," Experimental Economics, Springer;Economic Science Association, vol. 10(2), pages 171-178, June.
    Full references (including those not matched with items on IDEAS)

    Citations

    Citations are extracted by the CitEc Project, subscribe to its RSS feed for this item.
    as


    Cited by:

    1. Rosenkranz, Stephanie & Weitzel, Utz, 2012. "Network structure and strategic investments: An experimental analysis," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 75(2), pages 898-920.
    2. Charness, Gary & Feri, Francesco & Meléndez-Jiménez, Miguel A. & Sutter, Matthias, 2012. "Equilibrium Selection in Experimental Games on Networks," University of California at Santa Barbara, Economics Working Paper Series qt51v6w9hd, Department of Economics, UC Santa Barbara.

    More about this item

    Keywords

    Game Theory; Networks; Coordination Problems; Experiments;

    JEL classification:

    • C72 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Game Theory and Bargaining Theory - - - Noncooperative Games
    • C90 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Design of Experiments - - - General
    • C91 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Design of Experiments - - - Laboratory, Individual Behavior
    • D85 - Microeconomics - - Information, Knowledge, and Uncertainty - - - Network Formation

    NEP fields

    This paper has been announced in the following NEP Reports:

    Statistics

    Access and download statistics

    Corrections

    All material on this site has been provided by the respective publishers and authors. You can help correct errors and omissions. When requesting a correction, please mention this item's handle: RePEc:fem:femwpa:2010.49. See general information about how to correct material in RePEc.

    For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: (barbara racah). General contact details of provider: http://edirc.repec.org/data/feemmit.html .

    If you have authored this item and are not yet registered with RePEc, we encourage you to do it here. This allows to link your profile to this item. It also allows you to accept potential citations to this item that we are uncertain about.

    If CitEc recognized a reference but did not link an item in RePEc to it, you can help with this form .

    If you know of missing items citing this one, you can help us creating those links by adding the relevant references in the same way as above, for each refering item. If you are a registered author of this item, you may also want to check the "citations" tab in your RePEc Author Service profile, as there may be some citations waiting for confirmation.

    Please note that corrections may take a couple of weeks to filter through the various RePEc services.

    IDEAS is a RePEc service hosted by the Research Division of the Federal Reserve Bank of St. Louis . RePEc uses bibliographic data supplied by the respective publishers.