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A network experiment in continuous time : the influence of link costs

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  • Berninghaus, Siegfried
  • Ehrhart, Karl-Martin
  • Ott, Marion

Abstract

In recent work on non-cooperative network formation star-shaped networks play an important role. In a particular theoretical model of Bala and Goyal (2000) center-sponsored stars are the only strict Nash networks. In testing this theoretical model Falk and Kosfeld (2003) do not find any experimental evidence that players select the center-sponsored star. Based on a slight modification of Bala and Goyal's model we design a network formation experiment with varying link costs in which almost all groups not only reach a strict Nash network once but also switch strict Nash networks several times. The main innovation in our experiment is to use a continuous time framework which makes coordination on "stars" much easier than simultaneous strategy adaptation in discrete time.

Suggested Citation

  • Berninghaus, Siegfried & Ehrhart, Karl-Martin & Ott, Marion, 2005. "A network experiment in continuous time : the influence of link costs," Papers 05-02, Sonderforschungsbreich 504.
  • Handle: RePEc:mnh:spaper:2676
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    References listed on IDEAS

    as
    1. Falk Armin & Kosfeld Michael, 2012. "It's all about Connections: Evidence on Network Formation," Review of Network Economics, De Gruyter, vol. 11(3), pages 1-36, September.
    2. Robert P. Gilles & Cathleen Johnson, 2000. "original papers : Spatial social networks," Review of Economic Design, Springer;Society for Economic Design, vol. 5(3), pages 273-299.
    3. Werner Güth & Maria Vittoria Levati & Andreas Stiehler, "undated". "Privately Contributing to Public Goods over Time - An Experimental Study -," Papers on Strategic Interaction 2002-01, Max Planck Institute of Economics, Strategic Interaction Group.
    4. Corbae, Dean & Duffy, John, 2008. "Experiments with network formation," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 64(1), pages 81-120, September.
    5. Chmura, T. & Pitz, T., 2006. "Successful strategies in repeated minority games," Physica A: Statistical Mechanics and its Applications, Elsevier, vol. 363(2), pages 477-480.
    6. Jackson, Matthew O. & Wolinsky, Asher, 1996. "A Strategic Model of Social and Economic Networks," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 71(1), pages 44-74, October.
    7. Goyal, Sanjeev & Vega-Redondo, Fernando, 2005. "Network formation and social coordination," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 50(2), pages 178-207, February.
    8. Selten, Reinhard & Schreckenberg, Michael & Pitz, Thomas & Chmura, Thorsten & Kube, Sebastian, 2002. "Experiments and Simulations on Day-to-Day Route Choice-Behaviour," Bonn Econ Discussion Papers 35/2002, University of Bonn, Bonn Graduate School of Economics (BGSE).
    9. repec:bpj:rneart:v:3:y:2004:i:1:p:19-41 is not listed on IDEAS
    10. Venkatesh Bala & Sanjeev Goyal, 2000. "A Noncooperative Model of Network Formation," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 68(5), pages 1181-1230, September.
    11. Cary Deck & Cathleen Johnson, 2004. "Link bidding in laboratory networks," Review of Economic Design, Springer;Society for Economic Design, vol. 8(4), pages 359-372, April.
    12. Kosfeld Michael, 2004. "Economic Networks in the Laboratory: A Survey," Review of Network Economics, De Gruyter, vol. 3(1), pages 1-23, March.
    13. Siegfried Berninghaus & Karl-Martin Ehrhart & Claudia Keser, 1999. "Continuous-Time Strategy Selection in Linear Population Games," Experimental Economics, Springer;Economic Science Association, vol. 2(1), pages 41-57, August.
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    More about this item

    Keywords

    Network formation ; Nash networks ; real-time network experiments;

    JEL classification:

    • C92 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Design of Experiments - - - Laboratory, Group Behavior
    • C78 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Game Theory and Bargaining Theory - - - Bargaining Theory; Matching Theory
    • C72 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Game Theory and Bargaining Theory - - - Noncooperative Games

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