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Complexity of Networking - An Experimental Study of the Network Hawk Dove Game

  • Siegfried Berninghaus

    ()

    (Karlsruhe Institute of Technology)

  • Stephan Schosser

    ()

    (Karlsruhe Institute of Technology)

  • Bodo Vogt

    ()

    (Faculty of Economics and Management, Otto-von-Guericke University Magdeburg)

Registered author(s):

    Complexity of strategies is central for human decision making and attracted interest of different game theorists in the recent years. Nevertheless, behavioral economists have neglected the importance of complexity in their analyses. In this paper, we analyze network formation and action selection in a Hawk Dove Game with focus on complexity aspects. We conduct experiments with three variants of the game which are equivalent from a game theoretic perspective, but differ from a complexity theoretic perspective. Our results show, that complexity of decision making has an impact on the strategies played and that efficiency is higher the less complex the decision problem is.

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    File URL: http://www.fww.ovgu.de/fww_media/femm/femm_2011/2011_24.pdf
    File Function: First version, 2011
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    Paper provided by Otto-von-Guericke University Magdeburg, Faculty of Economics and Management in its series FEMM Working Papers with number 110024.

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    Length: 21 pages
    Date of creation: Nov 2011
    Date of revision:
    Handle: RePEc:mag:wpaper:110024
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    1. Pingle, Mark, 1992. "Costly optimization: an experiment," Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, Elsevier, vol. 17(1), pages 3-30, January.
    2. Ehud Kalai & William Stanford, 1986. "Finite Rationality and Interpersonal Complexity in Repeated Games," Discussion Papers 679, Northwestern University, Center for Mathematical Studies in Economics and Management Science.
    3. Berninghaus, Siegfried K. & Ehrhart, Karl-Martin & Ott, Marion, 2012. "Forward-looking behavior in Hawk–Dove games in endogenous networks: Experimental evidence," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 75(1), pages 35-52.
    4. Yann Bramoullé & Dunia López-Pintado & Sanjeev Goyal & Fernando Vega-Redondo, 2004. "Network formation and anti-coordination games," International Journal of Game Theory, Springer, vol. 33(1), pages 1-19, January.
    5. Neyman, Abraham, 1985. "Bounded complexity justifies cooperation in the finitely repeated prisoners' dilemma," Economics Letters, Elsevier, vol. 19(3), pages 227-229.
    6. Urs Fischbacher, 2007. "z-Tree: Zurich toolbox for ready-made economic experiments," Experimental Economics, Springer, vol. 10(2), pages 171-178, June.
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