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Communication and Guilt in a Prisoner's Dilemma

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  • Miettinen, T.
  • Suetens, S.

    (Tilburg University, Center For Economic Research)

Abstract

In this paper we measure experienced guilt in a prisoner’s dilemma experiment with pre-play communication. We find that feelings of guilt only arise in the case of unilateral defection and that they are stronger when players have mutually agreed to cooperate. We also find that fining unilateral defection reduces feelings of guilt.

Suggested Citation

  • Miettinen, T. & Suetens, S., 2008. "Communication and Guilt in a Prisoner's Dilemma," Discussion Paper 2008-12, Tilburg University, Center for Economic Research.
  • Handle: RePEc:tiu:tiucen:21efe04e-c98e-4b44-8934-ed7e2d0d0b22
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    References listed on IDEAS

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    Citations

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    Cited by:

    1. Donja Darai & Silvia Gr�tz, 2010. "Determinants of Successful Cooperation in a Face-to-Face Social Dilemma," SOI - Working Papers 1006, Socioeconomic Institute - University of Zurich, revised Nov 2010.
    2. Sebastian J. Goerg & Jan Meise & Gari Walkowitz & Eyal Winter, 2013. "Experimental Study of Bilateral Cooperation Under a Political Conflict: The Case of Israelis and Palestinians," Cologne Graduate School Working Paper Series 04-01, Cologne Graduate School in Management, Economics and Social Sciences, revised 21 Oct 2013.
    3. Boly Amadou & Gillanders Robert & Miettinen Topi, 2017. "Working Paper 277 - Deterrence and Legitimacy in Anti-Corruption Policymaking," Working Paper Series 2394, African Development Bank.
    4. Shoji, Masahiro, 2017. "Eliciting Guilt Sensitivity to Predict Real-World Behavior," MPRA Paper 81451, University Library of Munich, Germany.
    5. Jingnan (Cecilia) Chen & Daniel Houser, 2013. "Promises and Lies: An Experiment on Detecting Deception," Working Papers 1038, George Mason University, Interdisciplinary Center for Economic Science, revised Feb 2013.
    6. Shoji, Masahiro, 2013. "Guilt aversion and peer effects in crime: experimental and empirical evidence from Bangladesh," MPRA Paper 44746, University Library of Munich, Germany.
    7. Masahiro Shoji, 2014. "Channels of Peer Effects and Guilt Aversion in Crime: Experimental and Empirical Evidence from Bangladesh," CIRJE F-Series CIRJE-F-923, CIRJE, Faculty of Economics, University of Tokyo.
    8. Hongbin Li & Mark Rosenzweig & Junsen Zhang, 2010. "Altruism, Favoritism, and Guilt in the Allocation of Family Resources: Sophie's Choice in Mao's Mass Send-Down Movement," Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, vol. 118(1), pages 1-38, February.
    9. Amadou Boly & Robert Gillanders & Topi Miettinen, 2016. "Deterrence, peer effect, and legitimacy in anti-corruption policy-making: An experimental analysis," WIDER Working Paper Series 137, World Institute for Development Economic Research (UNU-WIDER).
    10. DECLERCK, Carolyn H. & BOONE, Christophe & KIYONARI, Toko, 2011. "No place to hide: When shame causes proselfs to cooperate," Working Papers 2011018, University of Antwerp, Faculty of Applied Economics.
    11. Michaeli, Moti, 2015. "Group Formation, In-group Bias and the Cost of Cheating," Economics Working Papers MWP2015/04, European University Institute.
    12. Jensen, Martin Kaae & Kozlovskaya, Maria, 2016. "A representation theorem for guilt aversion," Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, Elsevier, vol. 125(C), pages 148-161.
    13. Ronald Peeters & Marc Vorsatz, 2018. "Simple guilt and cooperation," Working Papers 1801, University of Otago, Department of Economics, revised Jan 2018.
    14. DeAngelo, Gregory & McCannon, Bryan C., 2017. "Theory of Mind predicts cooperative behavior," Economics Letters, Elsevier, vol. 155(C), pages 1-4.

    More about this item

    Keywords

    cooperation; guilt; experiments; prisoner’s dilemma; pre- play communication;

    JEL classification:

    • C91 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Design of Experiments - - - Laboratory, Individual Behavior
    • D74 - Microeconomics - - Analysis of Collective Decision-Making - - - Conflict; Conflict Resolution; Alliances; Revolutions

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