IDEAS home Printed from https://ideas.repec.org/a/eee/finana/v91y2024ics1057521923005045.html
   My bibliography  Save this article

Mixed-ownership structure, non-state-blockholder coalition, and tax avoidance

Author

Listed:
  • Long, Wenbin
  • Wu, Huiying
  • Li, Lidan
  • Ying, Sammy Xiaoyan
  • Li, Sihai

Abstract

This study examines the relationship between a coalition of non-state blockholders and corporate tax avoidance in a context in which state and non-state ownership coexist and the ownership structure is concentrated. Our results show that the dominance of non-state blockholders is positively associated with corporate tax avoidance and that the relationship is weakened by the state being the ultimate controller. Further analyses show that the relationship between non-state blockholder dominance and tax avoidance is weakened by the increased number of and greater heterogeneity among non-state blockholders. Moreover, the moderating effect of the state as the ultimate controller is more pronounced when there are fewer layers in the pyramidal state-shareholding structure and when the local government is the ultimate controller. In addition, we find that a tightening of regional tax enforcement efforts and the implementation of a 2007 tax reform weaken this relationship. Altogether, our results suggest that the collective power of non-state blockholder coalitions and the control strength of the state ultimate controller interact to influence corporate tax strategies.

Suggested Citation

  • Long, Wenbin & Wu, Huiying & Li, Lidan & Ying, Sammy Xiaoyan & Li, Sihai, 2024. "Mixed-ownership structure, non-state-blockholder coalition, and tax avoidance," International Review of Financial Analysis, Elsevier, vol. 91(C).
    • Handle: RePEc:eee:finana:v:91:y:2024:i:c:s1057521923005045
    DOI: 10.1016/j.irfa.2023.102988
    as

    Download full text from publisher

    File URL: http://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/pii/S1057521923005045
    Download Restriction: Full text for ScienceDirect subscribers only
    File URL: https://libkey.io/10.1016/j.irfa.2023.102988?utm_source=ideas
    LibKey link: if access is restricted and if your library uses this service, LibKey will redirect you to where you can use your library subscription to access this item
    ---><---

    As the access to this document is restricted, you may want to search for a different version of it.

    More about this item

    Keywords

    Tax avoidance; Ownership structure; Blockholder coalition; Ultimate controller;
    All these keywords.

    JEL classification:

    • G32 - Financial Economics - - Corporate Finance and Governance - - - Financing Policy; Financial Risk and Risk Management; Capital and Ownership Structure; Value of Firms; Goodwill
    • H26 - Public Economics - - Taxation, Subsidies, and Revenue - - - Tax Evasion and Avoidance
    • M49 - Business Administration and Business Economics; Marketing; Accounting; Personnel Economics - - Accounting - - - Other

    Statistics

    Access and download statistics

    Corrections

    All material on this site has been provided by the respective publishers and authors. You can help correct errors and omissions. When requesting a correction, please mention this item's handle: RePEc:eee:finana:v:91:y:2024:i:c:s1057521923005045. See general information about how to correct material in RePEc.

    If you have authored this item and are not yet registered with RePEc, we encourage you to do it here. This allows to link your profile to this item. It also allows you to accept potential citations to this item that we are uncertain about.

    We have no bibliographic references for this item. You can help adding them by using this form .

    If you know of missing items citing this one, you can help us creating those links by adding the relevant references in the same way as above, for each refering item. If you are a registered author of this item, you may also want to check the "citations" tab in your RePEc Author Service profile, as there may be some citations waiting for confirmation.

    For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: Catherine Liu (email available below). General contact details of provider: http://www.elsevier.com/locate/inca/620166 .

    Please note that corrections may take a couple of weeks to filter through the various RePEc services.

    IDEAS is a RePEc service. RePEc uses bibliographic data supplied by the respective publishers.