IDEAS home Printed from https://ideas.repec.org/a/eee/enepol/v50y2012icp570-580.html
   My bibliography  Save this article

OPEC: Market failure or power failure?

Author

Listed:
  • Cairns, Robert D.
  • Calfucura, Enrique

Abstract

The actions of OPEC and Saudi Arabia are discussed in terms of their objectives and their technical and social constraints. It is concluded (1) that OPEC does not act as a cartel and (2) that Hotelling’s rule is not an important feature of pricing or production. OPEC’s (more specifically, Saudi Arabia’s) ideal policy is to keep price moderate to try to assure a market for their high reserves over the long run. Such an action would require heavy investments in capacity, including in excess capacity, for times of interruption of supply from other countries as in the 1990s and for times of high demand as in the 2000s. The action may be inconsistent with other objectives and in any case may be too difficult to achieve.

Suggested Citation

  • Cairns, Robert D. & Calfucura, Enrique, 2012. "OPEC: Market failure or power failure?," Energy Policy, Elsevier, vol. 50(C), pages 570-580.
  • Handle: RePEc:eee:enepol:v:50:y:2012:i:c:p:570-580
    DOI: 10.1016/j.enpol.2012.07.058
    as

    Download full text from publisher

    File URL: http://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/pii/S0301421512006532
    Download Restriction: Full text for ScienceDirect subscribers only

    As the access to this document is restricted, you may want to search for a different version of it.

    References listed on IDEAS

    as
    1. Narayan, Paresh Kumar & Smyth, Russell, 2007. "A panel cointegration analysis of the demand for oil in the Middle East," Energy Policy, Elsevier, vol. 35(12), pages 6258-6265, December.
    2. Kamran Azadi, A. & Yarmohammad, Mohammad H., 2011. "Analysis of Iran's crude oil export future capacity," Energy Policy, Elsevier, vol. 39(6), pages 3316-3326, June.
    3. Lieberman, Marvin B, 1987. "Excess Capacity as a Barrier to Entry: An Empirical Appraisal," Journal of Industrial Economics, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 35(4), pages 607-627, June.
    4. James L. Smith, 2005. "Inscrutable OPEC? Behavioral Tests of the Cartel Hypothesis," The Energy Journal, International Association for Energy Economics, vol. 0(Number 1), pages 51-82.
    5. Daron Acemoglu & James A. Robinson, 2001. "A Theory of Political Transitions," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 91(4), pages 938-963, September.
    6. Cairns, Robert D., 2008. "Value and income," Ecological Economics, Elsevier, vol. 66(2-3), pages 417-424, June.
    7. Höök, Mikael & Hirsch, Robert & Aleklett, Kjell, 2009. "Giant oil field decline rates and their influence on world oil production," Energy Policy, Elsevier, vol. 37(6), pages 2262-2272, June.
    8. Hnyilicza, Esteban & Pindyck, Robert S., 1976. "Pricing policies for a two-part exhaustible resource cartel : The case of OPEC," European Economic Review, Elsevier, vol. 8(2), pages 139-154, August.
    9. Lutz Kilian, 2008. "The Economic Effects of Energy Price Shocks," Journal of Economic Literature, American Economic Association, vol. 46(4), pages 871-909, December.
    10. Kaufmann, Robert K. & Bradford, Andrew & Belanger, Laura H. & Mclaughlin, John P. & Miki, Yosuke, 2008. "Determinants of OPEC production: Implications for OPEC behavior," Energy Economics, Elsevier, vol. 30(2), pages 333-351, March.
    11. Kaufmann, Robert K., 2011. "The role of market fundamentals and speculation in recent price changes for crude oil," Energy Policy, Elsevier, vol. 39(1), pages 105-115, January.
    12. Alhajji, A. F. & Huettner, David, 2000. "OPEC and other commodity cartels: a comparison," Energy Policy, Elsevier, vol. 28(15), pages 1151-1164, December.
    13. Graham A. Davis, 2007. "Strike When the Force Is with You: Optimal Stopping with Application to Resource Equilibria," American Journal of Agricultural Economics, Agricultural and Applied Economics Association, vol. 89(2), pages 461-472.
    14. Masson, Robert T & Shaanan, Joseph, 1986. "Excess Capacity and Limit Pricing: An Empirical Test," Economica, London School of Economics and Political Science, vol. 53(211), pages 365-378, August.
    15. Radetzki, Marian, 2012. "Politics—not OPEC interventions—explain oil's extraordinary price history," Energy Policy, Elsevier, vol. 46(C), pages 382-385.
    16. Robert Cairns, 2001. "Capacity Choice and the Theory of the Mine," Environmental & Resource Economics, Springer;European Association of Environmental and Resource Economists, vol. 18(1), pages 129-148, January.
    17. Hartley, Peter & Medlock III, Kenneth B., 2008. "A model of the operation and development of a National Oil Company," Energy Economics, Elsevier, vol. 30(5), pages 2459-2485, September.
    18. Davis, Graham A. & Cairns, Robert D., 2012. "Good timing: The economics of optimal stopping," Journal of Economic Dynamics and Control, Elsevier, vol. 36(2), pages 255-265.
    19. Nourah A. Al-Yousef, 1998. "Economic Models of OPEC Behaviour and the Role of Saudi Arabia," Surrey Energy Economics Centre (SEEC), School of Economics Discussion Papers (SEEDS) 94, Surrey Energy Economics Centre (SEEC), School of Economics, University of Surrey.
    20. James L. Smith, 2009. "World Oil: Market or Mayhem?," Journal of Economic Perspectives, American Economic Association, vol. 23(3), pages 145-164, Summer.
    21. Considine, Timothy J., 2001. "Markup pricing in petroleum refining:: A multiproduct framework," International Journal of Industrial Organization, Elsevier, vol. 19(10), pages 1499-1526, December.
    22. Robert D. Cairns, 2009. "Green Accounting for Black Gold," The Energy Journal, International Association for Energy Economics, vol. 0(Number 4), pages 113-140.
    Full references (including those not matched with items on IDEAS)

    Citations

    Citations are extracted by the CitEc Project, subscribe to its RSS feed for this item.
    as


    Cited by:

    1. Mensi, Walid & Hammoudeh, Shawkat & Yoon, Seong-Min, 2014. "Structural breaks and long memory in modeling and forecasting volatility of foreign exchange markets of oil exporters: The importance of scheduled and unscheduled news announcements," International Review of Economics & Finance, Elsevier, vol. 30(C), pages 101-119.
    2. Rangan Gupta & Chi Keung Marco Lau & Seong-Min Yoon, 2019. "OPEC News Announcement Effect on Volatility in the Crude Oil Market: A Reconsideration," Advances in Decision Sciences, Asia University, Taiwan, vol. 23(4), pages 1-23, December.
    3. Alberto Behar & Robert A. Ritz, 2016. "OPEC vs US shale oil: Analyzing the shift to a market-share strategy," Cambridge Working Papers in Economics 1623, Faculty of Economics, University of Cambridge.
    4. Cairns, Robert D., 2014. "The green paradox of the economics of exhaustible resources," Energy Policy, Elsevier, vol. 65(C), pages 78-85.
    5. Behar, Alberto & Ritz, Robert A., 2017. "OPEC vs US shale: Analyzing the shift to a market-share strategy," Energy Economics, Elsevier, vol. 63(C), pages 185-198.
    6. Andrade de Sá, Saraly & Daubanes, Julien, 2016. "Limit pricing and the (in)effectiveness of the carbon tax," Journal of Public Economics, Elsevier, vol. 139(C), pages 28-39.
    7. Foroni, Claudia & Stracca, Livio, 2019. "Much ado about nothing? The shale oil revolution and the global supply curve," Working Paper Series 2309, European Central Bank.
    8. Golombek, Rolf & Irarrazabal, Alfonso A. & Ma, Lin, 2018. "OPEC's market power: An empirical dominant firm model for the oil market," Energy Economics, Elsevier, vol. 70(C), pages 98-115.
    9. Cuddington, John T. & Zellou, Abdel M., 2013. "A simple mineral market model: Can it produce super cycles in prices?," Resources Policy, Elsevier, vol. 38(1), pages 75-87.
    10. Ng, Yew-Kwang, 2018. "Ten rules for public economic policy," Economic Analysis and Policy, Elsevier, vol. 58(C), pages 32-42.
    11. Ratti, Ronald A. & Vespignani, Joaquin L., 2015. "OPEC and non-OPEC oil production and the global economy," Energy Economics, Elsevier, vol. 50(C), pages 364-378.
    12. Soummane, Salaheddine & Ghersi, Frédéric & Lefèvre, Julien, 2019. "Macroeconomic pathways of the Saudi economy: The challenge of global mitigation action versus the opportunity of national energy reforms," Energy Policy, Elsevier, vol. 130(C), pages 263-282.
    13. Colgan, Jeff D., 2014. "The Emperor Has No Clothes: The Limits of OPEC in the Global Oil Market," International Organization, Cambridge University Press, vol. 68(3), pages 599-632, July.
    14. Antonio Fernandois & Carlos A. Medel, 2020. "Geopolitical tensions, OPEC news, and the oil price: A granger causality analysis," Revista de Analisis Economico – Economic Analysis Review, Universidad Alberto Hurtado/School of Economics and Business, vol. 35(2), pages 57-90, October.
    15. Christiane Baumeister & Lutz Kilian, 2016. "Forty Years of Oil Price Fluctuations: Why the Price of Oil May Still Surprise Us," Journal of Economic Perspectives, American Economic Association, vol. 30(1), pages 139-160, Winter.
    16. Cairns, Robert D., 2018. "Stranded oil of Erewhon," Energy Policy, Elsevier, vol. 121(C), pages 248-251.
    17. Saraly Andrade de Sa & Julien Daubanes, 2014. "Limit-Pricing and the (Un)Effectiveness of the Carbon Tax," Working Papers 2014.07, FAERE - French Association of Environmental and Resource Economists.
    18. Mensi, Walid & Hammoudeh, Shawkat & Yoon, Seong-Min, 2014. "How do OPEC news and structural breaks impact returns and volatility in crude oil markets? Further evidence from a long memory process," Energy Economics, Elsevier, vol. 42(C), pages 343-354.
    19. Andrade de Sá, Saraly & Daubanes, Julien, 2016. "Limit pricing and the (in)effectiveness of the carbon tax," Journal of Public Economics, Elsevier, vol. 139(C), pages 28-39.

    More about this item

    Keywords

    Capacity; Natural decline; Limit price;

    Statistics

    Access and download statistics

    Corrections

    All material on this site has been provided by the respective publishers and authors. You can help correct errors and omissions. When requesting a correction, please mention this item's handle: RePEc:eee:enepol:v:50:y:2012:i:c:p:570-580. See general information about how to correct material in RePEc.

    For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: (Haili He). General contact details of provider: http://www.elsevier.com/locate/enpol .

    If you have authored this item and are not yet registered with RePEc, we encourage you to do it here. This allows to link your profile to this item. It also allows you to accept potential citations to this item that we are uncertain about.

    If CitEc recognized a reference but did not link an item in RePEc to it, you can help with this form .

    If you know of missing items citing this one, you can help us creating those links by adding the relevant references in the same way as above, for each refering item. If you are a registered author of this item, you may also want to check the "citations" tab in your RePEc Author Service profile, as there may be some citations waiting for confirmation.

    Please note that corrections may take a couple of weeks to filter through the various RePEc services.

    IDEAS is a RePEc service hosted by the Research Division of the Federal Reserve Bank of St. Louis . RePEc uses bibliographic data supplied by the respective publishers.