An agent-based approach equipped with game theory: Strategic collaboration among learning agents during a dynamic market change in the California electricity crisis
An agent-based approach is a numerical (computer-intensive) method to explore the complex characteristics and dynamics of microeconomics. Using the agent-based approach, this study investigates the learning speed of traders and their strategic collaboration in a dynamic market change of electricity. An example of such a market change can be found in the California electricity crisis (2000-2001). This study incorporates the concept of partial reinforcement learning into trading agents and finds that they have two learning components: learning from a dynamic market change and learning from collaboration with other traders. The learning speed of traders becomes slow when a large fluctuation occurs in the power exchange market. The learning speed depends upon the type of traders, their learning capabilities and the fluctuation of market fundamentals. The degree of collaboration among traders gradually reduces during the electricity crisis. The strategic collaboration among traders is examined by a large simulator equipped with multiple learning capabilities.
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