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Inflation uncertainty and unemployment uncertainty: Why transparency about monetary policy targets matters

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  • Sánchez, Marcelo

Abstract

Disclosure of monetary policy targets reduces unemployment uncertainty at the expense of higher inflation uncertainty, thereby posing a dilemma for monetary policymakers.

Suggested Citation

  • Sánchez, Marcelo, 2012. "Inflation uncertainty and unemployment uncertainty: Why transparency about monetary policy targets matters," Economics Letters, Elsevier, vol. 117(1), pages 119-122.
    • Handle: RePEc:eee:ecolet:v:117:y:2012:i:1:p:119-122
    DOI: 10.1016/j.econlet.2012.05.008
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    References listed on IDEAS

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    1. Cukierman Alex, 1992. "CENTRAL BANK STRATEGY, CREDIBILITY, AND INDEPENDANCE: THEORY AND EVIDENCE: Compte Rendu par Dominique Cariofillo," Journal des Economistes et des Etudes Humaines, De Gruyter, vol. 3(4), pages 581-590, December.
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    3. Gruener Hans Peter & Hayo Bernd & Hefeker Carsten, 2009. "Unions, Wage Setting and Monetary Policy Uncertainty," The B.E. Journal of Macroeconomics, De Gruyter, vol. 9(1), pages 1-25, October.
    4. Fabrizio Coricelli & Alex Cukierman & Alberto Dalmazzo, 2006. "Monetary Institutions, Monopolistic Competition, Unionized Labor Markets and Economic Performance," Scandinavian Journal of Economics, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 108(1), pages 39-63, March.
    5. Spyromitros, Eleftherios & Zimmer, Blandine, 2009. "Monetary accommodation and unemployment: Why central bank transparency matters," Economics Letters, Elsevier, vol. 102(2), pages 119-121, February.
    6. Holden, Steinar, 2005. "Monetary regimes and the co-ordination of wage setting," European Economic Review, Elsevier, vol. 49(4), pages 833-843, May.
    7. David Soskice & Torben Iversen, 2000. "The Nonneutrality of Monetary Policy with Large Price or Wage Setters," The Quarterly Journal of Economics, President and Fellows of Harvard College, vol. 115(1), pages 265-284.
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    9. S[empty]rensen, Jan Rose, 1991. "Political uncertainty and macroeconomic performance," Economics Letters, Elsevier, vol. 37(4), pages 377-381, December.
    10. Herrendorf, Berthold & Lockwood, Ben, 1997. "Rogoff's "Conservative" Central Banker Restored," Journal of Money, Credit and Banking, Blackwell Publishing, vol. 29(4), pages 476-495, November.
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    Keywords

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    JEL classification:

    • E24 - Macroeconomics and Monetary Economics - - Consumption, Saving, Production, Employment, and Investment - - - Employment; Unemployment; Wages; Intergenerational Income Distribution; Aggregate Human Capital; Aggregate Labor Productivity
    • E52 - Macroeconomics and Monetary Economics - - Monetary Policy, Central Banking, and the Supply of Money and Credit - - - Monetary Policy
    • J51 - Labor and Demographic Economics - - Labor-Management Relations, Trade Unions, and Collective Bargaining - - - Trade Unions: Objectives, Structure, and Effects

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