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Institutional Change, Inflation Targets and the Stability of Interest Rate Reaction Functions in OECD Economies"

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Listed author(s):
  • V A Muscatelli
  • Patrizio Tirelli

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Paper provided by Business School - Economics, University of Glasgow in its series Working Papers with number 9606.

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Date of creation: Nov 1995
Date of revision: Apr 1996
Handle: RePEc:gla:glaewp:9606
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Web page: http://www.gla.ac.uk/schools/business/research/

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  1. Kenneth Rogoff, 1985. "The Optimal Degree of Commitment to an Intermediate Monetary Target," The Quarterly Journal of Economics, Oxford University Press, vol. 100(4), pages 1169-1189.
  2. McCallum, Bennett T, 1995. "Two Fallacies Concerning Central-Bank Independence," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 85(2), pages 207-211, May.
  3. Eichengreen, Barry, 1987. "Conducting the international orchestra: Bank of England leadership under the classical gold standard," Journal of International Money and Finance, Elsevier, vol. 6(1), pages 5-29, March.
  4. Lohmann, Susanne, 1992. "Optimal Commitment in Monetary Policy: Credibility versus Flexibility," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 82(1), pages 273-286, March.
  5. King, Mervyn, 1995. "Credibility and Monetary Policy: Theory and Evidence," Scottish Journal of Political Economy, Scottish Economic Society, vol. 42(1), pages 1-19, February.
  6. Svensson, Lars E O, 1997. "Optimal Inflation Targets, "Conservative" Central Banks, and Linear Inflation Contracts," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 87(1), pages 98-114, March.
  7. Barro, Robert J. & Gordon, David B., 1983. "Rules, discretion and reputation in a model of monetary policy," Journal of Monetary Economics, Elsevier, vol. 12(1), pages 101-121.
  8. Jérôme Henry & Jens Weidmann, 1995. "Asymmetry in the EMS revisited: Evidence from the Causality Analysis of Daily Eurorates," Annals of Economics and Statistics, GENES, issue 40, pages 125-160.
  9. Goodhart, Charles A E, 1994. "Game Theory for Central Bankers: A Report to the Governor of the Bank of England," Journal of Economic Literature, American Economic Association, vol. 32(1), pages 101-114, March.
  10. Richard H. Clarida & Mark Gertler, 1997. "How the Bundesbank Conducts Monetary Policy," NBER Chapters,in: Reducing Inflation: Motivation and Strategy, pages 363-412 National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
  11. Lockwood, Ben & Miller, Marcus & Zhang, Lei, 1998. "Designing Monetary Policy When Unemployment Persists," Economica, London School of Economics and Political Science, vol. 65(259), pages 327-345, August.
  12. Obstfeld, Maurice, 1983. "Exchange rates, inflation, and the sterilization problem: Germany, 1975-1981," European Economic Review, Elsevier, vol. 21(1-2), pages 161-189.
  13. Michele Fratianni & Juergen Hagen, 1992. "German dominance in the EMS:The empirical evidence," Open Economies Review, Springer, vol. 3(1), pages 127-128, February.
  14. Clive Briault & Andrew Haldane & Mervyn King, 1996. "Independence and Accountability," Bank of England working papers 49, Bank of England.
  15. Alogoskoufis, George S & Lockwood, Ben & Philippopoulos, Apostolis, 1992. "Wage Inflation, Electoral Uncertainty and the Exchange Rate Regime: Theory and UK Evidence," Economic Journal, Royal Economic Society, vol. 102(415), pages 1370-1394, November.
  16. Herrendorf, Berthold & Lockwood, Ben, 1997. "Rogoff's "Conservative" Central Banker Restored," Journal of Money, Credit and Banking, Blackwell Publishing, vol. 29(4), pages 476-495, November.
  17. Michele Fratianni & Juergen Hagen, 1990. "German dominance in the EMS," Open Economies Review, Springer, vol. 1(1), pages 67-87, February.
  18. Christina D. Romer & David H. Romer, 1997. "Institutions for Monetary Stability," NBER Chapters,in: Reducing Inflation: Motivation and Strategy, pages 307-334 National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
  19. Persson, Torsten & Tabellini, Guido, 1993. "Designing institutions for monetary stability," Carnegie-Rochester Conference Series on Public Policy, Elsevier, vol. 39(1), pages 53-84, December.
  20. Johannes Groeneveld & Kees Koedijk & Clemens Kool, 1998. "Inflation Dynamics and Monetary Strategies: Evidence from Six Industrialized Countries," Open Economies Review, Springer, vol. 9(1), pages 21-38, January.
  21. Walsh, Carl E, 1995. "Optimal Contracts for Central Bankers," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 85(1), pages 150-167, March.
  22. Herring, Richard J. & Marston, Richard C., 1977. "Sterilization policy: The trade-off between monetary autonomy and control over foreign exchange reserves," European Economic Review, Elsevier, vol. 10(3), pages 325-343.
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Cited by:

  1. Muscatelli, Anton & Trecroci, Carmine, 2000. " Monetary Policy Rules, Policy Preferences, and Uncertainty: Recent Empirical Evidence," Journal of Economic Surveys, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 14(5), pages 597-627, December.
  2. Muscatelli, V Anton & Tirelli, Patrizio & Trecroci, Carmine, 2002. "Does Institutional Change Really Matter? Inflation Targets, Central Bank Reform and Interest Rate Policy in the OECD Countries," Manchester School, University of Manchester, vol. 70(4), pages 487-527, Special I.
  3. V. Anton Muscatelli & Patrizio Tirelli & Carmine Trecroci, 1998. "Institutional Change, Inflation Targeting and the Stability of Interest Rate Reaction Functions," Working Papers 9815, Business School - Economics, University of Glasgow, revised Aug 1998.
  4. Almeida, Alvaro & Goodhart, Charles & Payne, Richard, 1998. "The Effects of Macroeconomic News on High Frequency Exchange Rate Behavior," Journal of Financial and Quantitative Analysis, Cambridge University Press, vol. 33(03), pages 383-408, September.

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