Optimal delegation implications of central bank transparency
The interrelationship between monetary regime design and central bank transparency is examined. We find optimal delegation requires the central bank be either: 'representative', not choosing to publicly reveal its private information; or 'ultraconservative', deciding to be fully transparent.
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