Determinants of conservation among the rural poor: A charitable contribution experiment
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More about this item
KeywordsCooperative games; Field experiments; Microeconomic analyses of economic development; Development planning and policy; Renewable resources and conservation; Sierra Leone;
- C71 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Game Theory and Bargaining Theory - - - Cooperative Games
- C93 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Design of Experiments - - - Field Experiments
- O12 - Economic Development, Innovation, Technological Change, and Growth - - Economic Development - - - Microeconomic Analyses of Economic Development
- O20 - Economic Development, Innovation, Technological Change, and Growth - - Development Planning and Policy - - - General
- Q20 - Agricultural and Natural Resource Economics; Environmental and Ecological Economics - - Renewable Resources and Conservation - - - General
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