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Risk-incentive trade-off in moral hazard with risk management: Theoretical analysis and empirical verification

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  • Dou, Zheng
  • Lai, Chong

Abstract

This study incorporates risk management into a continuous-time principal–agent model based on moral hazard, analyzing how risk and incentives interact when preferences are risk-sensitive. We focus on how principal adjust compensation, comprising performance pay, risk penalties, and basic salaries, to incentivize agents under hidden information. Our findings confirm the classic negative trade-off between risk and incentives, alongside a novel positive relationship between risk and risk–penalty sensitivity. In high-risk environments, the principal frequently seeks out more skilled agents and offer them greater incentives, thus disrupting the relationship between risk and compensation sensitivities. Our empirical analysis underscores the significance of adaptive compensation strategies in improving agent behavior in the face of escalating risks, supporting these theoretical predictions. These insights underline the potential for refining incentive structures to better align with varying levels of firm risk.

Suggested Citation

  • Dou, Zheng & Lai, Chong, 2025. "Risk-incentive trade-off in moral hazard with risk management: Theoretical analysis and empirical verification," Economic Modelling, Elsevier, vol. 148(C).
    • Handle: RePEc:eee:ecmode:v:148:y:2025:i:c:s0264999325000781
    DOI: 10.1016/j.econmod.2025.107083
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    More about this item

    Keywords

    Optimal contracts; Principal–agent problem; Risk management; Risk-incentive trade-off; Moral hazard;
    All these keywords.

    JEL classification:

    • C61 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Mathematical Methods; Programming Models; Mathematical and Simulation Modeling - - - Optimization Techniques; Programming Models; Dynamic Analysis
    • G32 - Financial Economics - - Corporate Finance and Governance - - - Financing Policy; Financial Risk and Risk Management; Capital and Ownership Structure; Value of Firms; Goodwill
    • J31 - Labor and Demographic Economics - - Wages, Compensation, and Labor Costs - - - Wage Level and Structure; Wage Differentials
    • M52 - Business Administration and Business Economics; Marketing; Accounting; Personnel Economics - - Personnel Economics - - - Compensation and Compensation Methods and Their Effects

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