Executive compensation and earnings management under moral hazard
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DOI: 10.1016/j.jedc.2014.02.004
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- Bo Sun, 2009. "Executive compensation and earnings management under moral hazard," International Finance Discussion Papers 985, Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System (U.S.).
References listed on IDEAS
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Citations
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Cited by:
- Liu, Qi & Sun, Bo, 2015. "Managerial compensation under privately-observed hedging and earnings management," Economics Letters, Elsevier, vol. 137(C), pages 1-4.
- Koch, Timothy W. & Waggoner, Daniel F. & Wall, Larry D., 2018. "Incentive compensation, accounting discretion and bank capital," Journal of Economics and Business, Elsevier, vol. 95(C), pages 119-140.
- McWay, Ryan & Saona, Paolo & Muro, Laura & Jara, Mauricio, 2019. "Contrasting Incentives for Earnings Management: Board Activity and Board Remuneration in Spanish Firms," OSF Preprints xgn3y, Center for Open Science.
- Hani El-Chaarani, 2017. "The Mutual Impacts of Corporate Governance Dimensions and Legal Protection Systems on the Performance of European Banks: A Post-Crisis Study," European Research Studies Journal, European Research Studies Journal, vol. 0(2A), pages 538-567.
- Bo Sun, 2013. "The optimal shape of compensation contracts with earnings management," Applied Economics, Taylor & Francis Journals, vol. 45(21), pages 3102-3109, July.
- Mijoo Lee & In Tae Hwang, 2019. "The Effect of the Compensation System on Earnings Management and Sustainability: Evidence from Korea Banks," Sustainability, MDPI, Open Access Journal, vol. 11(11), pages 1-1, June.
More about this item
Keywords
Earnings management; Executive compensation; Optimal contract; Corporate governance;JEL classification:
- D82 - Microeconomics - - Information, Knowledge, and Uncertainty - - - Asymmetric and Private Information; Mechanism Design
- D86 - Microeconomics - - Information, Knowledge, and Uncertainty - - - Economics of Contract Law
- G38 - Financial Economics - - Corporate Finance and Governance - - - Government Policy and Regulation
- J31 - Labor and Demographic Economics - - Wages, Compensation, and Labor Costs - - - Wage Level and Structure; Wage Differentials
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