IDEAS home Printed from https://ideas.repec.org/a/eee/corfin/v18y2012i2p291-310.html
   My bibliography  Save this article

CEO pay cuts and forced turnover: Their causes and consequences

Author

Listed:
  • Gao, Huasheng
  • Harford, Jarrad
  • Li, Kai

Abstract

We study large discrete decreases in CEO pay and compare them to CEO forced turnover. The determinants are similar, as are the performance improvements after the action. After the pay cut, the CEO pay-for-performance sensitivity is abnormally high, such that the CEO can restore his pay level by reversing the poor performance. After either a pay cut or forced turnover, CEOs reduce investment and leverage, and improve performance, on average. Together, our results show that the possibility of these large compensation cuts provides ex ante incentives for CEOs to exert effort to avoid poor performance and that CEOs take actions to improve poor performance once pay is cut. The similarity of the causes and outcomes of large pay cuts compared to forced turnover suggests that large pay cuts are used as a substitute for forced turnover, helping to explain why forced turnover is rare.

Suggested Citation

  • Gao, Huasheng & Harford, Jarrad & Li, Kai, 2012. "CEO pay cuts and forced turnover: Their causes and consequences," Journal of Corporate Finance, Elsevier, vol. 18(2), pages 291-310.
    • Handle: RePEc:eee:corfin:v:18:y:2012:i:2:p:291-310
    DOI: 10.1016/j.jcorpfin.2012.01.001
    as

    Download full text from publisher

    File URL: http://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/pii/S092911991200003X
    Download Restriction: Full text for ScienceDirect subscribers only
    File URL: https://libkey.io/10.1016/j.jcorpfin.2012.01.001?utm_source=ideas
    LibKey link: if access is restricted and if your library uses this service, LibKey will redirect you to where you can use your library subscription to access this item
    ---><---

    As the access to this document is restricted, you may want to search for a different version of it.

    References listed on IDEAS

    as
    1. John E. Core & Wayne R. Guay & David F. Larcker, 2003. "Executive equity compensation and incentives: a survey," Economic Policy Review, Federal Reserve Bank of New York, vol. 9(Apr), pages 27-50.
    2. Brian J. Hall & Jeffrey B. Liebman, 1998. "Are CEOs Really Paid Like Bureaucrats?," The Quarterly Journal of Economics, President and Fellows of Harvard College, vol. 113(3), pages 653-691.
    3. Garvey, Gerald T. & Milbourn, Todd T., 2006. "Asymmetric benchmarking in compensation: Executives are rewarded for good luck but not penalized for bad," Journal of Financial Economics, Elsevier, vol. 82(1), pages 197-225, October.
    4. Denis, David J. & Denis, Diane K. & Sarin, Atulya, 1997. "Ownership structure and top executive turnover," Journal of Financial Economics, Elsevier, vol. 45(2), pages 193-221, August.
    5. Parrino, Robert, 1997. "CEO turnover and outside succession A cross-sectional analysis," Journal of Financial Economics, Elsevier, vol. 46(2), pages 165-197, November.
    6. Barber, Brad M. & Lyon, John D., 1996. "Detecting abnormal operating performance: The empirical power and specification of test statistics," Journal of Financial Economics, Elsevier, vol. 41(3), pages 359-399, July.
    7. Warner, Jerold B. & Watts, Ross L. & Wruck, Karen H., 1988. "Stock prices and top management changes," Journal of Financial Economics, Elsevier, vol. 20(1-2), pages 461-492, January.
    8. Stuart L. Gillan & Jay C. Hartzell & Robert Parrino, 2009. "Explicit versus Implicit Contracts: Evidence from CEO Employment Agreements," Journal of Finance, American Finance Association, vol. 64(4), pages 1629-1655, August.
    9. Jensen, Michael C. & Meckling, William H., 1976. "Theory of the firm: Managerial behavior, agency costs and ownership structure," Journal of Financial Economics, Elsevier, vol. 3(4), pages 305-360, October.
    10. Mark R. Huson & Robert Parrino & Laura T. Starks, 2001. "Internal Monitoring Mechanisms and CEO Turnover: A Long‐Term Perspective," Journal of Finance, American Finance Association, vol. 56(6), pages 2265-2297, December.
    11. Murphy, Kevin J., 1999. "Executive compensation," Handbook of Labor Economics, in: O. Ashenfelter & D. Card (ed.), Handbook of Labor Economics, edition 1, volume 3, chapter 38, pages 2485-2563, Elsevier.
    12. Jensen, Michael C & Murphy, Kevin J, 1990. "Performance Pay and Top-Management Incentives," Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, vol. 98(2), pages 225-264, April.
    13. Kalpathy, Swaminathan, 2009. "Stock Option Repricing and Its Alternatives: An Empirical Examination," Journal of Financial and Quantitative Analysis, Cambridge University Press, vol. 44(6), pages 1459-1487, December.
    14. Fama, Eugene F, 1980. "Agency Problems and the Theory of the Firm," Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, vol. 88(2), pages 288-307, April.
    15. Bebchuk, Lucian A. & Fried, Jesse M., 2003. "Executive Compensation as an Agency Problem," Berkeley Olin Program in Law & Economics, Working Paper Series qt81q3136r, Berkeley Olin Program in Law & Economics.
    16. Lucian Arye Bebchuk & Jesse M. Fried, 2003. "Executive Compensation as an Agency Problem," Journal of Economic Perspectives, American Economic Association, vol. 17(3), pages 71-92, Summer.
    17. Jarrad Harford & Kai Li & Xinlei Zhao, 2008. "Corporate boards and the leverage and debt maturity choices," International Journal of Corporate Governance, Inderscience Enterprises Ltd, vol. 1(1), pages 3-27.
    18. Core, John E. & Holthausen, Robert W. & Larcker, David F., 1999. "Corporate governance, chief executive officer compensation, and firm performance," Journal of Financial Economics, Elsevier, vol. 51(3), pages 371-406, March.
    19. Jay C. Hartzell & Laura T. Starks, 2003. "Institutional Investors and Executive Compensation," Journal of Finance, American Finance Association, vol. 58(6), pages 2351-2374, December.
    20. Huson, Mark R. & Malatesta, Paul H. & Parrino, Robert, 2004. "Managerial succession and firm performance," Journal of Financial Economics, Elsevier, vol. 74(2), pages 237-275, November.
    21. Weisbach, Michael S., 1988. "Outside directors and CEO turnover," Journal of Financial Economics, Elsevier, vol. 20(1-2), pages 431-460, January.
    22. Coughlan, Anne T. & Schmidt, Ronald M., 1985. "Executive compensation, management turnover, and firm performance : An empirical investigation," Journal of Accounting and Economics, Elsevier, vol. 7(1-3), pages 43-66, April.
    23. Denis, David J & Denis, Diane K, 1995. "Performance Changes Following Top Management Dismissals," Journal of Finance, American Finance Association, vol. 50(4), pages 1029-1057, September.
    Full references (including those not matched with items on IDEAS)

    Citations

    Citations are extracted by the CitEc Project, subscribe to its RSS feed for this item.
    as


    Cited by:

    1. Hornstein, Abigail S., 2013. "Corporate capital budgeting and CEO turnover," Journal of Corporate Finance, Elsevier, vol. 20(C), pages 41-58.
    2. Stanton, Christopher T. & Sandvik, Jason & Saouma, Richard & Seegert, Nathan, 2018. "Analyzing the Aftermath of a Compensation Reduction," CEPR Discussion Papers 13242, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers.
    3. Frank Ranganai Matenda & Mabutho Sibanda & Eriyoti Chikodza & Victor Gumbo, 2021. "Determinants of corporate exposure at default under distressed economic and financial conditions in a developing economy: the case of Zimbabwe," Risk Management, Palgrave Macmillan, vol. 23(1), pages 123-149, June.
    4. Frank Ranganai Matenda & Mabutho Sibanda & Eriyoti Chikodza & Victor Gumbo, 2022. "Bankruptcy prediction for private firms in developing economies: a scoping review and guidance for future research," Management Review Quarterly, Springer, vol. 72(4), pages 927-966, December.
    5. Kou, Zonglai & Tang, Yue & Wu, Hong & Zhou, Min, 2023. "Ownership, volatility, and equity incentives: Theory and evidence from listed companies in China," Economic Modelling, Elsevier, vol. 128(C).
    6. Brown, Kareen & Pacharn, Parunchana & Patterson, Evelyn, 2022. "Managerial replacement strategies and severance pay," Advances in accounting, Elsevier, vol. 56(C).
    7. Gao, Huasheng & Li, Kai, 2015. "A comparison of CEO pay–performance sensitivity in privately-held and public firms," Journal of Corporate Finance, Elsevier, vol. 35(C), pages 370-388.
    8. Ho, Hillbun & Kim, Namwoon & Reza, Sadat, 2022. "CSR and CEO pay: Does CEO reputation matter?," Journal of Business Research, Elsevier, vol. 149(C), pages 1034-1049.
    9. Cready, William M. & Dai, Zhonglan & Ma, Guang & Nanda, Vikram, 2024. "Information in unexpected bonus cuts: Firm performance and CEO firings," Journal of Empirical Finance, Elsevier, vol. 76(C).
    10. Çolak, Gönül & Korkeamäki, Timo, 2021. "CEO mobility and corporate policy risk," Journal of Corporate Finance, Elsevier, vol. 69(C).
    11. Pieter de Jong & Lakshmi Goel, 2016. "The influence of security analysts on CEO pay cuts," International Journal of Disclosure and Governance, Palgrave Macmillan, vol. 13(1), pages 26-52, February.
    12. IZUMI Atsuko & KWON Hyeog Ug, 2015. "Change in Corporate Performance after Forcing Out CEOs: Comparison between the United States and Japan (Japanese)," Discussion Papers (Japanese) 15032, Research Institute of Economy, Trade and Industry (RIETI).
    13. Evangelos C. Charalambakis, 2014. "On corporate financial distress prediction: what can we learn from private firms in a small open economy?," Working Papers 188, Bank of Greece.
    14. Bedford, Anna & Bugeja, Martin & Ghannam, Samir & Jeganathan, Davina & Ma, Nelson, 2023. "Were CEO pay cuts during the COVID-19 pandemic merely symbolic? Shareholders' reaction and outrage," Pacific-Basin Finance Journal, Elsevier, vol. 79(C).
    15. Ciaran Driver & Maria João Coelho Guedes, 2017. "R&D and CEO departure date: do financial incentives make CEOs more opportunistic?," Industrial and Corporate Change, Oxford University Press and the Associazione ICC, vol. 26(5), pages 801-820.
    16. Evangelos C. Charalambakis & Ian Garrett, 2019. "On corporate financial distress prediction: What can we learn from private firms in a developing economy? Evidence from Greece," Review of Quantitative Finance and Accounting, Springer, vol. 52(2), pages 467-491, February.
    17. Bryan, David B. & Mason, Terry W., 2016. "Extreme CEO pay cuts and audit fees," Advances in accounting, Elsevier, vol. 33(C), pages 1-10.
    18. Inho Suk & Seungwon Lee & William Kross, 2021. "CEO Turnover and Accounting Earnings: The Role of Earnings Persistence," Management Science, INFORMS, vol. 67(5), pages 3195-3218, May.

    Most related items

    These are the items that most often cite the same works as this one and are cited by the same works as this one.
    1. Renneboog, L.D.R. & Trojanowski, G., 2002. "The Managerial Labor Market and the Governance Role of Shareholder Control Structures in the UK," Discussion Paper 2002-68, Tilburg University, Center for Economic Research.
    2. Brookman, Jeff & Thistle, Paul D., 2009. "CEO tenure, the risk of termination and firm value," Journal of Corporate Finance, Elsevier, vol. 15(3), pages 331-344, June.
    3. Dirk Jenter & Fadi Kanaan, 2015. "CEO Turnover and Relative Performance Evaluation," Journal of Finance, American Finance Association, vol. 70(5), pages 2155-2184, October.
    4. David Blackwell & Donna Dudney & Kathleen Farrell, 2007. "Changes in CEO compensation structure and the impact on firm performance following CEO turnover," Review of Quantitative Finance and Accounting, Springer, vol. 29(3), pages 315-338, October.
    5. Matthias Kiefer & Edward Jones & Andrew Adams, 2016. "Principals, Agents and Incomplete Contracts: Are Surrender of Control and Renegotiation the Solution?," CFI Discussion Papers 1603, Centre for Finance and Investment, Heriot Watt University.
    6. Dah, Mustafa A. & Frye, Melissa B., 2017. "Is board compensation excessive?," Journal of Corporate Finance, Elsevier, vol. 45(C), pages 566-585.
    7. Dirk Jenter & Katharina Lewellen, 2021. "Performance-Induced CEO Turnover [The “Wall Street Walk” and shareholder activism: Exit as a form of voice]," The Review of Financial Studies, Society for Financial Studies, vol. 34(2), pages 569-617.
    8. Barbara Voußem & Utz Schäffer & Denis Schweizer, 2015. "Top management turnover under the influence of activist investors," Journal of Management & Governance, Springer;Accademia Italiana di Economia Aziendale (AIDEA), vol. 19(3), pages 709-739, August.
    9. ter Weel, Bas, 2006. "Does Manager Turnover Improve Firm Performance? New Evidence Using Information from Dutch Soccer, 1986-2004," IZA Discussion Papers 2483, Institute of Labor Economics (IZA).
    10. Bas Weel, 2011. "Does Manager Turnover Improve Firm Performance? Evidence from Dutch Soccer, 1986–2004," De Economist, Springer, vol. 159(3), pages 279-303, September.
    11. Narayanan Subramanian & Atreya Chakraborty & Shahbaz Sheikh, 2002. "Performance Incentives, Performance Pressure and Executive Turnover," Finance 0210003, University Library of Munich, Germany, revised 24 Oct 2002.
    12. Antonio Falato & Dalida Kadyrzhanova, 2012. "CEO successions and firm performance in the US financial industry," Finance and Economics Discussion Series 2012-79, Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System (U.S.).
    13. Chakraborty, Atreya & Sheikh, Shahbaz & Subramanian, Narayanan, 2009. "The relationship between incentive compensation and performance related CEO turnover," Journal of Economics and Business, Elsevier, vol. 61(4), pages 295-311, July.
    14. Loureiro, Gilberto & Makhija, Anil K. & Zhang, Dan, 2011. "Why Do Some CEOs Work for a One-Dollary Salary?," Working Paper Series 2011-7, Ohio State University, Charles A. Dice Center for Research in Financial Economics.
    15. Fee, C. Edward & Hadlock, Charles J., 2004. "Management turnover across the corporate hierarchy," Journal of Accounting and Economics, Elsevier, vol. 37(1), pages 3-38, February.
    16. Chen, Jie & Song, Wei & Goergen, Marc, 2019. "Passing the dividend baton: The impact of dividend policy on new CEOs' initial compensation," Journal of Corporate Finance, Elsevier, vol. 56(C), pages 458-481.
    17. Carola Frydman & Dirk Jenter, 2010. "CEO Compensation," Annual Review of Financial Economics, Annual Reviews, vol. 2(1), pages 75-102, December.
    18. Bushman, Robert M. & Smith, Abbie J., 2001. "Financial accounting information and corporate governance," Journal of Accounting and Economics, Elsevier, vol. 32(1-3), pages 237-333, December.
    19. Eckbo, B. Espen & Thorburn, Karin S. & Wang, Wei, 2016. "How costly is corporate bankruptcy for the CEO?," Journal of Financial Economics, Elsevier, vol. 121(1), pages 210-229.
    20. Chongwoo Choe & Gloria Tian & Xiangkang Yin, 2008. "Managerial Power, Stock-Based Compensation, And Firm Performance: Theory And Evidence," Monash Economics Working Papers 21/08, Monash University, Department of Economics.

    More about this item

    Keywords

    Corporate governance; Executive compensation; Pay cuts; Forced turnover; Pay-for-performance sensitivity;
    All these keywords.

    JEL classification:

    • G34 - Financial Economics - - Corporate Finance and Governance - - - Mergers; Acquisitions; Restructuring; Corporate Governance

    Statistics

    Access and download statistics

    Corrections

    All material on this site has been provided by the respective publishers and authors. You can help correct errors and omissions. When requesting a correction, please mention this item's handle: RePEc:eee:corfin:v:18:y:2012:i:2:p:291-310. See general information about how to correct material in RePEc.

    If you have authored this item and are not yet registered with RePEc, we encourage you to do it here. This allows to link your profile to this item. It also allows you to accept potential citations to this item that we are uncertain about.

    If CitEc recognized a bibliographic reference but did not link an item in RePEc to it, you can help with this form .

    If you know of missing items citing this one, you can help us creating those links by adding the relevant references in the same way as above, for each refering item. If you are a registered author of this item, you may also want to check the "citations" tab in your RePEc Author Service profile, as there may be some citations waiting for confirmation.

    For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: Catherine Liu (email available below). General contact details of provider: http://www.elsevier.com/locate/jcorpfin .

    Please note that corrections may take a couple of weeks to filter through the various RePEc services.

    IDEAS is a RePEc service. RePEc uses bibliographic data supplied by the respective publishers.