A view from behavioral political economy on China's institutional change
A behavioral political economy framework is built on the basis of prospect theory to explain the induced and imposed institutional changes during China's market reform, giving special attention to the integrated effects of economic and political institutions. According to prospect theory, how rulers frame their decisions — in the prospects of gains or losses, influences how much risk they will take. China's market reform has been largely framed in the prospects of economic gains, for which the continuously growing private sector is the driving force. China's central government adopts a growth-oriented incremental reform that coincides with the prediction of prospect theory.
If you experience problems downloading a file, check if you have the proper application to view it first. In case of further problems read the IDEAS help page. Note that these files are not on the IDEAS site. Please be patient as the files may be large.
As the access to this document is restricted, you may want to look for a different version under "Related research" (further below) or search for a different version of it.
References listed on IDEAS
Please report citation or reference errors to , or , if you are the registered author of the cited work, log in to your RePEc Author Service profile, click on "citations" and make appropriate adjustments.:
- T. W. Schultz, 1968. "Institutions and the Rising Economic Value of Man," American Journal of Agricultural Economics, Agricultural and Applied Economics Association, vol. 50(5), pages 1113-1122.
- Qian, Yingyi & Roland, Gerard, 1998.
"Federalism and the Soft Budget Constraint,"
American Economic Review,
American Economic Association, vol. 88(5), pages 1143-1162, December.
- Yingyi Qian & Gerard Roland, "undated". "Federalism and the Soft Budget Constraint," Working Papers 97045, Stanford University, Department of Economics.
- Yingyi Qian & Chenggang Xu, 1993. "Why China's economic reforms differ: the M-form hierarchy and entry/expansion of the non-state sector," The Economics of Transition, The European Bank for Reconstruction and Development, vol. 1(2), pages 135-170, 06.
- Yingyi Qian & Chenggang Xu, 1993. "Why Chinas Economic Reforms Differ: The M-Form Hierarchy and Entry/Expansion of the Non-State Sector," CEP Discussion Papers dp0154, Centre for Economic Performance, LSE.
- Mikhail Filippov, 2005. "Riker and Federalism," Constitutional Political Economy, Springer, vol. 16(2), pages 93-111, 06.
- Kahneman, Daniel & Tversky, Amos, 1979. "Prospect Theory: An Analysis of Decision under Risk," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 47(2), pages 263-291, March.
- Amos Tversky & Daniel Kahneman, 1979. "Prospect Theory: An Analysis of Decision under Risk," Levine's Working Paper Archive 7656, David K. Levine.
- Samuelson, William & Zeckhauser, Richard, 1988. "Status Quo Bias in Decision Making," Journal of Risk and Uncertainty, Springer, vol. 1(1), pages 7-59, March.
- Eric Maskin & Yingyi Qian & Chenggang Xu, 2000. "Incentives, Information, and Organizational Form," Review of Economic Studies, Oxford University Press, vol. 67(2), pages 359-378.
- Eric Maskin & Yingyi Qian & Chenggang Xu, 1997. "Incentives, Information, and Organizational Form," Working Papers 97034, Stanford University, Department of Economics.
- Eric Maskin & Yingyi Qian & Chenggang Xu, 1999. "Incentives, Information, and Organizational Form," Working Papers 99009, Stanford University, Department of Economics.
- Olivier Blanchard & Andrei Shleifer, 2001. "Federalism With and Without Political Centralization: China Versus Russia," IMF Staff Papers, Palgrave Macmillan, vol. 48(4), pages 1-8.
- Olivier Blanchard & Andrei Shleifer, 2000. "Federalism With and Without Political Centralization. China versus Russia," Harvard Institute of Economic Research Working Papers 1889, Harvard - Institute of Economic Research.
- Olivier Blanchard & Andrei Shleifer, 2000. "Federalism with and without Political Centralization: China versus Russia," NBER Working Papers 7616, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
- Amos Tversky & Daniel Kahneman, 1991. "Loss Aversion in Riskless Choice: A Reference-Dependent Model," The Quarterly Journal of Economics, Oxford University Press, vol. 106(4), pages 1039-1061.
- Jean-Jacques Laffont, 1988. "Fundamentals of Public Economics," MIT Press Books, The MIT Press, edition 1, volume 1, number 0262121271, July.
- Yingyi Qian & Barry R. Weingast, 1997. "Federalism as a Commitment to Reserving Market Incentives," Journal of Economic Perspectives, American Economic Association, vol. 11(4), pages 83-92, Fall.
- Yingyi Qian & Barry R. Weingast, 1997. "Federalism as a Commitment to Preserving Market Incentives," Working Papers 97042, Stanford University, Department of Economics.
- Justin Yifu Lin, 1989. "An Economic Theory of Institutional Change: Induced and Imposed Change," Cato Journal, Cato Journal, Cato Institute, vol. 9(1), pages 1-33, Spring/Su.
- Chenggang Xu, 2011. "The Fundamental Institutions of China's Reforms and Development," Journal of Economic Literature, American Economic Association, vol. 49(4), pages 1076-1151, December.
- Jin, Hehui & Qian, Yingyi & Weingast, Barry R., 2005. "Regional decentralization and fiscal incentives: Federalism, Chinese style," Journal of Public Economics, Elsevier, vol. 89(9-10), pages 1719-1742, September.
- Hehui Jin & Yingyi Qian & Barry Weingast, 1999. "Regional Decentralization and Fiscal Incentives: Federalism, Chinese Style," Working Papers 99013, Stanford University, Department of Economics.
- Anthony Downs, 1957. "An Economic Theory of Political Action in a Democracy," Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, vol. 65, pages 135-135.
- Mueller,Dennis C., 2003. "Public Choice III," Cambridge Books, Cambridge University Press, number 9780521894753, Diciembre. Full references (including those not matched with items on IDEAS)
When requesting a correction, please mention this item's handle: RePEc:eee:chieco:v:23:y:2012:i:4:p:991-1002. See general information about how to correct material in RePEc.
For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: (Dana Niculescu)
If references are entirely missing, you can add them using this form.