A view from behavioral political economy on China's institutional change
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More about this item
KeywordsBehavioral economics; China; Incremental reform; Institutional change; Political economy;
- D03 - Microeconomics - - General - - - Behavioral Microeconomics: Underlying Principles
- D70 - Microeconomics - - Analysis of Collective Decision-Making - - - General
- O43 - Economic Development, Innovation, Technological Change, and Growth - - Economic Growth and Aggregate Productivity - - - Institutions and Growth
- P26 - Economic Systems - - Socialist Systems and Transition Economies - - - Political Economy
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