IDEAS home Printed from https://ideas.repec.org/a/eee/apmaco/v490y2025ics0096300324006696.html

The effect of ecological compensation on a coevolutionary common pool resource game

Author

Listed:
  • Gao, Liyan
  • Pan, Qiuhui
  • He, Mingfeng

Abstract

Ecological compensation plays an important role in the governance of renewable resource. When the resource stock is not higher than the compensation threshold, the defector of excessive effort pays compensation cost to restore resources. This paper establishes a coupled social ecosystem based on the ecological compensation mechanism by using evolutionary game theory. It is found that ecological compensation mechanism can promote cooperation, realize the sustainable utilization of resources, narrow the fitness gap between agents and facilitate higher payoff for the population. There exists an optimal compensation intensity that makes the system in an ideal state with the highest cooperation level, sustainable resources and maximum population fitness. Compensation intensity exceeding the optimal value has no additional influence on the system. The impact of compensation threshold on the system is jump like and there are two critical values of compensation threshold. As long as the compensation threshold exceeds the larger critical value, the system can reach the ideal state. These findings provide theoretical basis for the relevant institutions to better formulate ecological compensation policies.

Suggested Citation

  • Gao, Liyan & Pan, Qiuhui & He, Mingfeng, 2025. "The effect of ecological compensation on a coevolutionary common pool resource game," Applied Mathematics and Computation, Elsevier, vol. 490(C).
    • Handle: RePEc:eee:apmaco:v:490:y:2025:i:c:s0096300324006696
    DOI: 10.1016/j.amc.2024.129208
    as

    Download full text from publisher

    File URL: http://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/pii/S0096300324006696
    Download Restriction: Full text for ScienceDirect subscribers only
    File URL: https://libkey.io/10.1016/j.amc.2024.129208?utm_source=ideas
    LibKey link: if access is restricted and if your library uses this service, LibKey will redirect you to where you can use your library subscription to access this item
    ---><---

    As the access to this document is restricted, you may want to

    for a different version of it.

    References listed on IDEAS

    as
    1. repec:osf:socarx:w2cxp_v1 is not listed on IDEAS
    2. M. Djiguemde & D. Dubois & A. Sauquet & M. Tidball, 2022. "Continuous Versus Discrete Time in Dynamic Common Pool Resource Game Experiments," Environmental & Resource Economics, Springer;European Association of Environmental and Resource Economists, vol. 82(4), pages 985-1014, August.
    3. Hu, Liwen & He, Nanrong & Weng, Qifeng & Chen, Xiaojie & Perc, Matjaž, 2020. "Rewarding endowments lead to a win-win in the evolution of public cooperation and the accumulation of common resources," Chaos, Solitons & Fractals, Elsevier, vol. 134(C).
    4. Jiang, Yanan & Guan, Dongjie & He, Xiujuan & Yin, Boling & Zhou, Lilei & Sun, Lingli & Huang, Danan & Li, Zihui & Zhang, Yanjun, 2022. "Quantification of the coupling relationship between ecological compensation and ecosystem services in the Yangtze River Economic Belt, China," Land Use Policy, Elsevier, vol. 114(C).
    5. Pei, Sha & Zhang, Chunxiao & Liu, Chunlan & Liu, Xiaona & Xie, Gaodi, 2019. "Forest ecological compensation standard based on spatial flowing of water services in the upper reaches of Miyun Reservoir, China," Ecosystem Services, Elsevier, vol. 39(C).
    6. Joëlle Noailly & Cees Withagen & Jeroen Bergh, 2007. "Spatial Evolution of Social Norms in a Common-Pool Resource Game," Environmental & Resource Economics, Springer;European Association of Environmental and Resource Economists, vol. 36(1), pages 113-141, January.
    7. Quanxi Wang & Ni Wang & Haodong Wang & Yuan Xiu, 2022. "Study on Influencing Factors and Simulation of Watershed Ecological Compensation Based on Evolutionary Game," Sustainability, MDPI, vol. 14(6), pages 1-23, March.
    8. Schauf, Andrew & Oh, Poong, 2021. "Myopic reallocation of extraction improves collective outcomes in networked common-pool resource games," SocArXiv w2cxp, Center for Open Science.
    9. Ostrom, Elinor, 2006. "The value-added of laboratory experiments for the study of institutions and common-pool resources," Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, Elsevier, vol. 61(2), pages 149-163, October.
    10. Sethi, Rajiv & Somanathan, E, 2006. "A Simple Model of Collective Action," Economic Development and Cultural Change, University of Chicago Press, vol. 54(3), pages 725-747, April.
    11. Farolfi, Stefano & Erdlenbruch, Katrin, 2020. "A classroom experimental game to improve the understanding of asymmetric common-pool resource dilemmas in irrigation water management," International Review of Economics Education, Elsevier, vol. 35(C).
    12. Min, Yong & Du, Yuchen & Jin, Cheng, 2018. "The effect of link rewiring on a coevolutionary common pool resource game," Physica A: Statistical Mechanics and its Applications, Elsevier, vol. 512(C), pages 935-944.
    13. Tambunlertchai, Kanittha & Pongkijvorasin, Sittidaj, 2021. "Regulatory stringency and behavior in a common pool resource game: Lab and field experiments," Journal of Asian Economics, Elsevier, vol. 74(C).
    14. Sethi, Rajiv & Somanathan, E, 1996. "The Evolution of Social Norms in Common Property Resource Use," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 86(4), pages 766-788, September.
    15. Hao Sun & Guangkuo Gao & Zonghuo Li, 2021. "Research on the cooperative mechanism of government and enterprise for basin ecological compensation based on differential game," PLOS ONE, Public Library of Science, vol. 16(7), pages 1-21, July.
    16. Kimbrough, Erik O. & Vostroknutov, Alexander, 2015. "The social and ecological determinants of common pool resource sustainability," Journal of Environmental Economics and Management, Elsevier, vol. 72(C), pages 38-53.
    17. Edvard Hviding & Graham B. K. Baines, 1994. "Community‐based Fisheries Management, Tradition and the Challenges of Development in Marovo, Solomon Islands," Development and Change, International Institute of Social Studies, vol. 25(1), pages 13-39, January.
    18. Yingbo Qin & Wenping Wang, 2022. "Research on Ecological Compensation Mechanism for Energy Economy Sustainable Based on Evolutionary Game Model," Energies, MDPI, vol. 15(8), pages 1-14, April.
    19. Li, Meng & Lu, Shibao & Li, Wei, 2022. "Stakeholders′ ecological-economic compensation of river basin: A multi-stage dynamic game analysis," Resources Policy, Elsevier, vol. 79(C).
    Full references (including those not matched with items on IDEAS)

    Citations

    Citations are extracted by the CitEc Project, subscribe to its RSS feed for this item.
    as


    Cited by:

    1. Li, Dandan & Wu, Qiongzi & Han, Dun, 2025. "On evolution of agent behavior under limited gaming time with reinforcement learning," Chaos, Solitons & Fractals, Elsevier, vol. 194(C).

    Most related items

    These are the items that most often cite the same works as this one and are cited by the same works as this one.
    1. Libois, François, 2022. "Success and failure of communities managing natural resources: Static and dynamic inefficiencies," Journal of Environmental Economics and Management, Elsevier, vol. 114(C).
    2. Tavoni, Alessandro & Schluter, Maja & Levin, Simon, 2010. "The Survival of the Conformist: Social Pressure and Renewable Resource Management," Sustainable Development Papers 96843, Fondazione Eni Enrico Mattei (FEEM).
    3. Gao, Liyan & Pan, Qiuhui & He, Mingfeng, 2024. "Impact of dynamic compensation with resource feedback on the common pool resource game," Chaos, Solitons & Fractals, Elsevier, vol. 180(C).
    4. Petrohilos-Andrianos, Yannis & Xepapadeas, Anastasios, 2017. "Resource harvesting regulation and enforcement: An evolutionary approach," Research in Economics, Elsevier, vol. 71(2), pages 236-253.
    5. Chengqing Pan & Li Wang & Haishu Lu & Tianyu Lu, 2025. "Research on the Evolutionary Game of Rural River Governance Under the River Chief System," Sustainability, MDPI, vol. 17(10), pages 1-29, May.
    6. Mingjie Song & Doudou Huang & Basanta Paudel, 2022. "A Supply-Demand Framework for Eco-Compensation Calculation and Allocation in China’s National Key Ecological Function Areas—A Case Study in the Yangtze River Economic Belt," Land, MDPI, vol. 12(1), pages 1-22, December.
    7. Bezin, Emeline & Ponthière, Gregory, 2019. "The tragedy of the commons and socialization: Theory and policy," Journal of Environmental Economics and Management, Elsevier, vol. 98(C).
    8. Michèle Breton & Lucia Sbragia & Georges Zaccour, 2010. "A Dynamic Model for International Environmental Agreements," Environmental & Resource Economics, Springer;European Association of Environmental and Resource Economists, vol. 45(1), pages 25-48, January.
    9. Jean-Philippe Atzenhoffer, 2012. "Could free-riders promote cooperation in the commons?," Environmental Economics and Policy Studies, Springer;Society for Environmental Economics and Policy Studies - SEEPS, vol. 14(1), pages 85-101, January.
    10. Jeroen Bergh, 2007. "Evolutionary thinking in environmental economics," Journal of Evolutionary Economics, Springer, vol. 17(5), pages 521-549, October.
    11. Hembach-Stunden, Katharina & Vorlaufer, Tobias & Engel, Stefanie, 2024. "Threshold ambiguity and sustainable resource management: A lab experiment," Ecological Economics, Elsevier, vol. 226(C).
    12. Richter, Andries & Grasman, Johan, 2013. "The transmission of sustainable harvesting norms when agents are conditionally cooperative," Ecological Economics, Elsevier, vol. 93(C), pages 202-209.
    13. Joëlle Noailly & Jeroen Bergh & Cees Withagen, 2009. "Local and Global Interactions in an Evolutionary Resource Game," Computational Economics, Springer;Society for Computational Economics, vol. 33(2), pages 155-173, March.
    14. Marchiori, Carmen, 2014. "Inequality and rules in the governance of water resources," Ecological Economics, Elsevier, vol. 105(C), pages 124-129.
    15. Nøstbakken, Linda, 2013. "Formal and informal quota enforcement," Resource and Energy Economics, Elsevier, vol. 35(2), pages 191-215.
    16. Li Ma & Danbo Pang & Jie Gao & Wenbin Wang & Ruoxiu Sun, 2023. "Ecological Asset Assessment and Ecological Compensation Standards for Desert Nature Reserves: Evidence from Three Different Climate Zones in China," Sustainability, MDPI, vol. 15(13), pages 1-17, July.
    17. Kwabena A. Owusu & Micaela M. Kulesz & Agostino Merico, 2019. "Extraction Behaviour and Income Inequalities Resulting from a Common Pool Resource Exploitation," Sustainability, MDPI, vol. 11(2), pages 1-13, January.
    18. Galanis, Giorgos & Ricchiuti, Giorgio & Tippet, Ben, 2025. "Heterogeneity and Global Climate Action," CRETA Online Discussion Paper Series 91, Centre for Research in Economic Theory and its Applications CRETA.
    19. Shuxian Wang & Chao Liu & Xinhai Lu & Xia Hong & Shuangyu Yang, 2025. "How does ecological compensation change in Hubei Province based on a multi-scenario simulation of ecosystem services value?," Humanities and Social Sciences Communications, Palgrave Macmillan, vol. 12(1), pages 1-21, December.
    20. Juan Camilo C√°rdenas & CÔøΩsar Mantilla & Rajiv Sethi, 2013. "Commons without Tragedy: Sampling Dynamics and Cooperative Resource Extraction," Documentos CEDE 11892, Universidad de los Andes, Facultad de Economía, CEDE.

    More about this item

    Keywords

    ;
    ;
    ;
    ;

    Statistics

    Access and download statistics

    Corrections

    All material on this site has been provided by the respective publishers and authors. You can help correct errors and omissions. When requesting a correction, please mention this item's handle: RePEc:eee:apmaco:v:490:y:2025:i:c:s0096300324006696. See general information about how to correct material in RePEc.

    If you have authored this item and are not yet registered with RePEc, we encourage you to do it here. This allows to link your profile to this item. It also allows you to accept potential citations to this item that we are uncertain about.

    If CitEc recognized a bibliographic reference but did not link an item in RePEc to it, you can help with this form .

    If you know of missing items citing this one, you can help us creating those links by adding the relevant references in the same way as above, for each refering item. If you are a registered author of this item, you may also want to check the "citations" tab in your RePEc Author Service profile, as there may be some citations waiting for confirmation.

    For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: Catherine Liu (email available below). General contact details of provider: https://www.journals.elsevier.com/applied-mathematics-and-computation .

    Please note that corrections may take a couple of weeks to filter through the various RePEc services.

    IDEAS is a RePEc service. RePEc uses bibliographic data supplied by the respective publishers.