Price Discrimination with Producer & Consumer Transaction Costs
This paper examines the impact of transaction costs on the social efficiency of first-degree price discrimination. Price discrimination requires the producer to expend resources and compels consumers to incur costs. The consideration of producer and consumer transaction costs alters the conditions under which first degree price discrimination enhances social welfare.
Volume (Year): 32 (2012)
Issue (Month): 1 ()
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- V. Bhaskar & Ted To, 2004.
"Is Perfect Price Discrimination Really Efficient? An Analysis of Free Entry,"
RAND Journal of Economics,
The RAND Corporation, vol. 35(4), pages 762-776, Winter.
- Bhaskar, V & To, Ted, 2002. "Is perfect price discrimination really efficient? An analysis of free entry," Economics Discussion Papers 8840, University of Essex, Department of Economics.
- Leeson, Peter T. & Sobel, Russell S., 2008. "Costly price discrimination," Economics Letters, Elsevier, vol. 99(1), pages 206-208, April.
- Armstrong, Mark, 2006. "Price discrimination," MPRA Paper 4693, University Library of Munich, Germany.
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