The Feldstein-Horioka puzzle and law
In this paper, we introduce a proxy for the legal protection of investors, a dummy variable that indicates legal origins, into the Feldstein and Horioka (1980, Economic Journal 90) saving-investment regression. The estimations show that in the French-civil-law countries, which have the weakest investor protection, the domestic investment rates are generally less strongly correlated with the domestic saving rates. This implies that in countries with less investor protection, the capital resulting from an increase of domestic saving tends to flow to foreign countries with stronger investor protection, rather than into domestic investment.
Volume (Year): 11 (2003)
Issue (Month): 1 ()
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References listed on IDEAS
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- Andrei Shleifer & Daniel Wolfenson, 2000.
"Investor Protection and Equity Markets,"
Harvard Institute of Economic Research Working Papers
1906, Harvard - Institute of Economic Research.
- Asli Demirgüç-Kunt & Vojislav Maksimovic, 1998. "Law, Finance, and Firm Growth," Journal of Finance, American Finance Association, vol. 53(6), pages 2107-2137, December.
- Martin Feldstein & Charles Horioka, 1979.
"Domestic Savings and International Capital Flows,"
NBER Working Papers
0310, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
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