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Prior Restrictions on Bargaining Contract Curves

Author

Listed:
  • Jan K. Brueckner

    (University of Illinois at Urbana-Champaign)

Abstract

It is well-known that the efficient-bargain model imposes no general restrictions on the slope of the contract curve. As a result, both upward- and downward-sloping curves are consistent with the theory. Less is known, however, about the effect on the contract curve of changes in the demand and supply variables that underlie employer and union indifference maps and help determine curve's position. To aid empirical researchers, this paper analyzes the effects of demand and supply variables on the position of the contract curve and states the minimal prior restrictions that can be placed on these effects.

Suggested Citation

  • Jan K. Brueckner, 2001. "Prior Restrictions on Bargaining Contract Curves," Economics Bulletin, AccessEcon, vol. 10(1), pages 1-7.
    • Handle: RePEc:ebl:ecbull:eb-01j50001
    as

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    File URL: http://www.accessecon.com/pubs/EB/2001/Volume10/EB-01J50001A.pdf
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    References listed on IDEAS

    as
    1. MaCurdy, Thomas E & Pencavel, John H, 1986. "Testing between Competing Models of Wage and Employment Determination in Unionized Markets," Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, vol. 94(3), pages 3-39, June.
    2. Brown, James N & Ashenfelter, Orley, 1986. "Testing the Efficiency of Employment Contracts," Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, vol. 94(3), pages 40-87, June.
    3. Jan Brueckner & Kevin O'Brien, 1989. "Modeling government behavior in collective bargaining: A test for self-interested bureaucrats," Public Choice, Springer, vol. 63(1), pages 15-41, October.
    4. Eberts, Randall W & Stone, Joe A, 1986. "On the Contract Curve: A Test of Alternative Models of Collective Bargaining," Journal of Labor Economics, University of Chicago Press, vol. 4(1), pages 66-81, January.
    5. Joseph Gyourko & Joseph Tracy, 1989. "Public Sector Bargaining and the Local Budgetary Process," NBER Working Papers 2915, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
    Full references (including those not matched with items on IDEAS)

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    Cited by:

    1. Nicholas Lawson, 2011. "Is Collective Bargaining Pareto Efficient? A Survey of the Literature," Journal of Labor Research, Springer, vol. 32(3), pages 282-304, September.
    2. repec:pri:indrel:dsp01cc08hf62w is not listed on IDEAS
    3. János Köllo, 2011. "Hungary: Crisis Coupled with a Fiscal Squeeze – Effects on Inequality," Chapters, in: Daniel Vaughan-Whitehead (ed.), Work Inequalities in the Crisis, chapter 7, Edward Elgar Publishing.
    4. Köllő, János, 2010. "Vállalati reakciók a gazdasági válságra, 2008-2009 [Corporate reactions to the economic crisis, 2008-9]," Közgazdasági Szemle (Economic Review - monthly of the Hungarian Academy of Sciences), Közgazdasági Szemle Alapítvány (Economic Review Foundation), vol. 0(12), pages 1045-1064.
    5. Karoly Fazekas & Gyorgy Molnar (ed.), 2011. "The Hungarian Labour Market 2011," The Hungarian Labour Market Yearbooks, Institute of Economics, Centre for Economic and Regional Studies, number 2011, December.

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    More about this item

    Keywords

    contract curve;

    JEL classification:

    • J5 - Labor and Demographic Economics - - Labor-Management Relations, Trade Unions, and Collective Bargaining
    • J6 - Labor and Demographic Economics - - Mobility, Unemployment, Vacancies, and Immigrant Workers

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