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Director's Incentives in Japan and the UK

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  • Katsuyuki Kubo

Abstract

As it is widely believed that the behaviour of large Japanese companies is different from that of their British counterparts, hypothesises that the directors in both countries may have different financial incentives. The research estimates the determinants of executive compensation, using the micro data of listed companies in both countries. Our result suggests that directors in Japan may have little incentive to pursue shareholders' interest while directors in the UK may have an incentive to maximise its value in stock markets. These results may be consistent with the view that large companies in Japan often neglect shareholders' interest.

Suggested Citation

  • Katsuyuki Kubo, 2001. "Director's Incentives in Japan and the UK," Vierteljahrshefte zur Wirtschaftsforschung / Quarterly Journal of Economic Research, DIW Berlin, German Institute for Economic Research, vol. 70(2), pages 228-232.
    • Handle: RePEc:diw:diwvjh:70-20-7
    DOI: 10.3790/vjh.70.2.228
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    References listed on IDEAS

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    1. Rosen, S., 1990. "Contracts and Market for Executives," University of Chicago - Economics Research Center 90-12, Chicago - Economics Research Center.
    2. Kaplan, Steven N, 1994. "Top Executive Rewards and Firm Performance: A Comparison of Japan and the United States," Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, vol. 102(3), pages 510-546, June.
    3. Steven N. Kaplan, 1992. "Top Executive Rewards and Firm Performance: A Comparison of Japan and the U.S," NBER Working Papers 4065, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
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    Cited by:

    1. Abe, Naohito & Gaston, Noel & Kubo, Katsuyuki, 2005. "Executive pay in Japan: the role of bank-appointed monitors and the Main Bank relationship," Japan and the World Economy, Elsevier, vol. 17(3), pages 371-394, August.

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