La banque à forme coopérative peut-elle soutenir durablement la compétition avec la banque SA?
(VF)Alors que la littérature anglo-saxonne conclut majoritairement à l’inefficacité de la forme coopérative, la situation française semble faire figure d’exception. L’objectif du présent article est d'expliquer premièrement pourquoi la coopérative a pu être considérée comme une forme d’organisation inadaptée à l’environnement bancaire actuel (1). Deuxièmement, nous tenterons d’évaluer la portée et les limites théoriques de ces analyses et de mesurer l’efficacité des banques coopératives dans le cas français (2). Enfin, nous nous interrogerons sur la pérennité de leur stratégie de développement récente (3).(VA)The Anglo-american literature generally concludes that cooperative banks are inefficient and doomed to disappear. In France however, the situation seems quite different. We analyze why and how cooperative banks have been considered as inefficient (1). Then we focus on French cooperative banks and try to measure their efficiency and competitiveness (2). Last, we discuss whether recent changes in the emerging cooperative groups are compatible with their development strategy (3).
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