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Dynamic Effort, Sustainability, Myopia, and 110% Effort


  • Shmanske Stephen

    (California State University, East Bay)


By definition, giving 100 percent effort all of the time is sustainable, but begs the question of how to define 100 percent effort. As a corollary, once a benchmark for defining 100 percent effort is chosen, it may be possible, even optimal, to give a greater amount of effort for a short period of time, while recognizing that this level of effort is not sustainable. This dynamic effort provision problem is analyzed in the context of effort and performance by National Basketball Association (NBA) players over the course of a season. Within this context, several benchmarks for sustainable effort are considered, but these are rejected by the data. Meanwhile, the data are consistent with the proposition that NBA players put forth optimal effort, even if such effort is not always sustainable.

Suggested Citation

  • Shmanske Stephen, 2011. "Dynamic Effort, Sustainability, Myopia, and 110% Effort," Journal of Quantitative Analysis in Sports, De Gruyter, vol. 7(2), pages 1-19, May.
  • Handle: RePEc:bpj:jqsprt:v:7:y:2011:i:2:n:2

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    References listed on IDEAS

    1. Lazear, Edward P & Rosen, Sherwin, 1981. "Rank-Order Tournaments as Optimum Labor Contracts," Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, vol. 89(5), pages 841-864, October.
    2. David J. Berri & Anthony C. Krautmann, 2006. "Shirking on the Court: Testing for the Incentive Effects of Guaranteed Pay," Economic Inquiry, Western Economic Association International, vol. 44(3), pages 536-546, July.
    3. Ehrenberg, Ronald G & Bognanno, Michael L, 1990. "Do Tournaments Have Incentive Effects?," Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, vol. 98(6), pages 1307-1324, December.
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