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Shirking on the Court: Testing for the Incentive Effects of Guaranteed Pay

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  • David J. Berri
  • Anthony C. Krautmann

Abstract

Prior work on long-term contracts and the incentive to shirk has focused almost exclusively on Major League Baseball. The current inquiry is the first to examine shirking in the National Basketball Association. We employed two different measures of player productivity. When the NBA's measure is used, we find evidence consistent with allegations of shirking behavior. But when productivity is measured in a fashion more consistent with economists' definition of marginal product, the evidence of shirking evaporates. (JEL J41, J44, L83) Copyright 2006, Oxford University Press.

Suggested Citation

  • David J. Berri & Anthony C. Krautmann, 2006. "Shirking on the Court: Testing for the Incentive Effects of Guaranteed Pay," Economic Inquiry, Western Economic Association International, vol. 44(3), pages 536-546, July.
  • Handle: RePEc:oup:ecinqu:v:44:y:2006:i:3:p:536-546
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    References listed on IDEAS

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    Cited by:

    1. Markus Schaffner & Benno Torgler, 2008. "Meet the Joneses: An Empirical Investigation of Reference Groups in Relative Income Position Comparisons," School of Economics and Finance Discussion Papers and Working Papers Series 234, School of Economics and Finance, Queensland University of Technology, revised 17 Jun 2008.
    2. Christoph Bühren & Stefan Krabel, 2015. "Individual Performance after Success and Failure - A Natural Experiment," MAGKS Papers on Economics 201505, Philipps-Universität Marburg, Faculty of Business Administration and Economics, Department of Economics (Volkswirtschaftliche Abteilung).
    3. Joshua Congdon-Hohman & Jonathan A. Lanning, 2013. "Workers' Responses to Incentives: The Case of Pending MLB Free Agents," Working Papers 1304, College of the Holy Cross, Department of Economics.
    4. Dilger, Alexander, 2017. "Doping in teams: A simple decision theoretic model
      [Doping in Teams: Ein einfaches entscheidungstheoretisches Modell]
      ," Discussion Papers of the Institute for Organisational Economics 6/2017, University of Münster, Institute for Organisational Economics.
    5. Shmanske Stephen, 2011. "Dynamic Effort, Sustainability, Myopia, and 110% Effort," Journal of Quantitative Analysis in Sports, De Gruyter, vol. 7(2), pages 1-19, May.
    6. Alex Bryson & Giambattista Rossi & Rob Simmons, 2012. "Why Are Migrants Paid More?," CEP Discussion Papers dp1134, Centre for Economic Performance, LSE.
    7. Simmons, Rob & Berri, David J., 2011. "Mixing the princes and the paupers: Pay and performance in the National Basketball Association," Labour Economics, Elsevier, vol. 18(3), pages 381-388, June.
    8. Bernd Frick & Rob Simmons, 2014. "The footballers’ labour market after the Bosman ruling," Chapters,in: Handbook on the Economics of Professional Football, chapter 13, pages 203-226 Edward Elgar Publishing.
    9. Stephen Shmanske, 2010. "Dynamic Effort, Sustainability, Myopia, and 110% Effort," Working Papers 1005, International Association of Sports Economists;North American Association of Sports Economists.
    10. Garner, Jacqueline & Humphrey, Phillip R. & Simkins, Betty, 2016. "The business of sport and the sport of business: A review of the compensation literature in finance and sports," International Review of Financial Analysis, Elsevier, vol. 47(C), pages 197-204.
    11. Feddersen, Arne & Humphreys, Brad & Soebbing, Brian, 2012. "Cost Incentives in European Football," Working Papers 2012-13, University of Alberta, Department of Economics.
    12. Müller, Michael, 2016. "The strongest link in a weak team? Performance of players with and without outside options in relegated football clubs," Discussion Papers of the Institute for Organisational Economics 07/2016, University of Münster, Institute for Organisational Economics.

    More about this item

    JEL classification:

    • J41 - Labor and Demographic Economics - - Particular Labor Markets - - - Labor Contracts
    • J44 - Labor and Demographic Economics - - Particular Labor Markets - - - Professional Labor Markets and Occupations
    • L83 - Industrial Organization - - Industry Studies: Services - - - Sports; Gambling; Restaurants; Recreation; Tourism

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