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Political Connectedness and Firm Performance: Evidence from Germany

Author

Listed:
  • Niessen Alexandra
  • Ruenzi Stefan

    (University of Mannheim, Mannheim, Germany)

Abstract

This paper investigates politically connected firms in Germany. With the introduction of a new transparency law in 2007, information on additional income sources for all members of the German parliament became publicly available. We find that members of the conservative party (CDU/CSU) and the liberal party (FDP) are more likely to work for firms than members of left-wing parties (SPD and The Left) or the green party (Alliance 90/The Greens). Politically connected firms are larger, less risky and have lower market valuations than unconnected firms. They also have fewer growth opportunities, but slightly better accounting performance. On the stock market, connected firms significantly outperformed unconnected firms in 2006, i.e. before the publication of the data on political connections. Differences in stock market performance were much smaller in 2007.

Suggested Citation

  • Niessen Alexandra & Ruenzi Stefan, 2010. "Political Connectedness and Firm Performance: Evidence from Germany," German Economic Review, De Gruyter, vol. 11(4), pages 441-464, December.
    • Handle: RePEc:bpj:germec:v:11:y:2010:i:4:p:441-464
    DOI: 10.1111/j.1468-0475.2009.00482.x
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    Citations

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    Cited by:

    1. Unsal, Omer & Hassan, M. Kabir & Zirek, Duygu, 2016. "Corporate lobbying, CEO political ideology and firm performance," Journal of Corporate Finance, Elsevier, vol. 38(C), pages 126-149.
    2. Xie, Rui & Zhang, Jiahuan & Tang, Chuan, 2023. "Political connection and water pollution: New evidence from Chinese listed firms," Resource and Energy Economics, Elsevier, vol. 74(C).
    3. Unsal, Omer & Kabir Hassan, M. & Zirek, Duygu, 2017. "Corporate lobbying and labor relations: Evidence from employee-level litigations," Journal of Corporate Finance, Elsevier, vol. 46(C), pages 411-441.
    4. Gaygysyz Ashyrov & Oliver Lukason, 2022. "Political Connectedness and Financial Performance of SMEs," JRFM, MDPI, vol. 15(12), pages 1-17, December.
    5. Iman Harymawan & Mohammad Nasih & Muhammad Madyan & Diarany Sucahyati, 2019. "The Role of Political Connections on Family Firms’ Performance: Evidence from Indonesia," IJFS, MDPI, vol. 7(4), pages 1-14, September.
    6. Chen, Yutong & Chiplunkar, Gaurav & Sekhri, Sheetal & Sen, Anirban & Seth, Aaditeshwar, 2023. "How Do Political Connections of Firms Matter during an Economic Crisis?," IZA Discussion Papers 16131, Institute of Labor Economics (IZA).
    7. Omer Unsal & M. Kabir Hassan & William J. Hippler, 2016. "Lobbying in Finance Industry: Evidence from US Banking System," NFI Working Papers 2017-WP-03, Indiana State University, Scott College of Business, Networks Financial Institute.

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