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The Role of Farmers' Risk aversion for Contract Choice in the US Hog Industry

Author

Listed:
  • Zheng Xiaoyong

    (North Carolina State University)

  • Vukina Tomislav

    (North Carolina State University)

  • Shin Changmock

    (Samsung Economic Research Institute)

Abstract

In this paper we estimate the farmers' side welfare effects of a hypothetical regulatory scenario that would partially eliminate production contracts in the hog industry. Using the Agricultural Resource Management Survey (ARMS) data for 2004, farmers' production costs under different marketing arrangements are estimated and then used to recover their individual risk aversion parameters with the help of a structural expected profit maximization model. The results show that farmers who use production contracts are more risk averse than farmers who use spot markets or marketing contracts. The regulation that forces producers to market their hogs in a riskier marketing channel relative to the channel they themselves selected imposes large welfare losses on the affected farmers.

Suggested Citation

  • Zheng Xiaoyong & Vukina Tomislav & Shin Changmock, 2008. "The Role of Farmers' Risk aversion for Contract Choice in the US Hog Industry," Journal of Agricultural & Food Industrial Organization, De Gruyter, vol. 6(1), pages 1-22, June.
    • Handle: RePEc:bpj:bjafio:v:6:y:2008:i:1:n:4
    DOI: 10.2202/1542-0485.1220
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    References listed on IDEAS

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    Citations

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    Cited by:

    1. Xi Yang & Nicholas D. Paulson & Madhu Khanna, 2016. "Optimal Mix of Vertical Integration and Contracting for Energy Crops: Effect of Risk Preferences and Land Quality," Applied Economic Perspectives and Policy, Agricultural and Applied Economics Association, vol. 38(4), pages 632-654.
    2. Jason R.V. Franken & Joost M.E. Pennings & Philip Garcia, 2017. "Risk attitudes and the structure of decision†making: evidence from the Illinois hog industry," Agricultural Economics, International Association of Agricultural Economists, vol. 48(1), pages 41-50, January.
    3. Franken, Jason R.V. & Pennings, Joost M.E. & Garcia, Philip, 2009. "Do Transaction Costs and Risk Preferences Influence Marketing Arrangements in the Illinois Hog Industry?," Journal of Agricultural and Resource Economics, Western Agricultural Economics Association, vol. 34(2), pages 1-19, August.
    4. Paulson Nicholas D & Katchova Ani L & Lence Sergio H, 2010. "An Empirical Analysis of the Determinants of Marketing Contract Structures for Corn and Soybeans," Journal of Agricultural & Food Industrial Organization, De Gruyter, vol. 8(1), pages 1-25, May.
    5. Stefano Ciliberti & Simone Del Sarto & Angelo Frascarelli & Giulia Pastorelli & Gaetano Martino, 2020. "Contracts to Govern the Transition towards Sustainable Production: Evidence from a Discrete Choice Analysis in the Durum Wheat Sector in Italy," Sustainability, MDPI, vol. 12(22), pages 1-14, November.
    6. Azzeddine Azzam & Gibson Nene & Karina Schoengold, 2015. "Hog Industry Structure and the Stringency of Environmental Regulation," Canadian Journal of Agricultural Economics/Revue canadienne d'agroeconomie, Canadian Agricultural Economics Society/Societe canadienne d'agroeconomie, vol. 63(3), pages 333-358, September.
    7. Jensen, Kimberly L. & English, Burton C. & Clark, Christopher D. & Menard, R. Jamey, 2011. "Preferences for Marketing Arrangements by Potential Switchgrass Growers," Journal of Cooperatives, NCERA-210, vol. 25, pages 1-28.
    8. Woldie Getachew Abebe, 2010. "Optimal Farmer Choice of Marketing Channels in the Ethiopian Banana Market," Journal of Agricultural & Food Industrial Organization, De Gruyter, vol. 8(1), pages 1-19, October.
    9. Wu-Yueh HU, 2013. "Effect of contract farming on the U.S. crop farmers' average return," Agricultural Economics, Czech Academy of Agricultural Sciences, vol. 59(5), pages 195-201.
    10. Hanna Ihli & Ronja Seegers & Etti Winter & Brian Chiputwa & Anja Gassner, 2022. "Preferences for tree fruit market attributes among smallholder farmers in Eastern Rwanda," Agricultural Economics, International Association of Agricultural Economists, vol. 53(1), pages 5-21, January.
    11. Fischer, Sabine & Wollni, Meike, 2018. "The role of farmers’ trust, risk and time preferences for contract choices: Experimental evidence from the Ghanaian pineapple sector," Food Policy, Elsevier, vol. 81(C), pages 67-81.
    12. Niemi, Jarkko K. & Liu, Xing & Pietola, Kyosti, 2011. "Price volatility and return on pig fattening under different price- quantity contract regimes," 2011 International Congress, August 30-September 2, 2011, Zurich, Switzerland 114614, European Association of Agricultural Economists.
    13. Hu, Wu-Yueh & Vukina, Tomislav & Zheng, Viaoyong, 2014. "The Role of Risk and Risk-Aversion in Adoption of Alternative Marketing Arrangements by the U.S. Farmers," 2014 Annual Meeting, July 27-29, 2014, Minneapolis, Minnesota 168930, Agricultural and Applied Economics Association.
    14. Max Zongyuan Shang & Ken McEwan, 2021. "The make‐or‐buy decision of feed on livestock farms: Evidence from Ontario swine farms," Canadian Journal of Agricultural Economics/Revue canadienne d'agroeconomie, Canadian Agricultural Economics Society/Societe canadienne d'agroeconomie, vol. 69(3), pages 353-368, September.
    15. Niemi, Jarkko K., 2012. "Designing coordination contracts to support efficient flow-scheduling in pork chain," 2012 Annual Meeting, August 12-14, 2012, Seattle, Washington 125208, Agricultural and Applied Economics Association.

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