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Fiscal policy and the output costs of sovereign default

Author

Listed:
  • Durán Leyre Gómez-Oliveros

    (European Commission, Brussels, Belgium)

  • Niemann Stefan

    (Department of Economics, University of Essex, Colchester, UK)

  • Pichler Paul

    (University of Vienna, Department of Economics, Vienna, Austria)

Abstract

We introduce fiscal policy into a sovereign debt model with endogenous default costs and examine the implications for the determination of the output costs of default. We find that the quantitative properties of the output costs of default, and their dependence on primitives such as the elasticity of labor supply, are distinctly different depending on the margin of fiscal adjustment. The consideration of fiscal policy thus has potentially important implications for the quantitative properties of models of sovereign debt and default.

Suggested Citation

  • Durán Leyre Gómez-Oliveros & Niemann Stefan & Pichler Paul, 2020. "Fiscal policy and the output costs of sovereign default," The B.E. Journal of Macroeconomics, De Gruyter, vol. 20(1), pages 1-11, January.
    • Handle: RePEc:bpj:bejmac:v:20:y:2020:i:1:p:11:n:13
    DOI: 10.1515/bejm-2017-0236
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    References listed on IDEAS

    as
    1. Cristina Arellano, 2008. "Default Risk and Income Fluctuations in Emerging Economies," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 98(3), pages 690-712, June.
    2. Tavares, Tiago, 2015. "Labor Market Distortions under Sovereign Default Crises," MPRA Paper 66964, University Library of Munich, Germany.
    3. Gabriel Cuadra & Juan Sanchez & Horacio Sapriza, 2010. "Fiscal Policy and Default Risk in Emerging Markets," Review of Economic Dynamics, Elsevier for the Society for Economic Dynamics, vol. 13(2), pages 452-469, April.
    4. Jonathan Eaton & Mark Gersovitz, 1981. "Debt with Potential Repudiation: Theoretical and Empirical Analysis," The Review of Economic Studies, Review of Economic Studies Ltd, vol. 48(2), pages 289-309.
    5. Aguiar, Mark & Gopinath, Gita, 2006. "Defaultable debt, interest rates and the current account," Journal of International Economics, Elsevier, vol. 69(1), pages 64-83, June.
    6. Carlos A. Vegh & Guillermo Vuletin, 2015. "How Is Tax Policy Conducted over the Business Cycle?," American Economic Journal: Economic Policy, American Economic Association, vol. 7(3), pages 327-370, August.
    7. Stefan Niemann & Paul Pichler, 2020. "Optimal fiscal policy and sovereign debt crises," Review of Economic Dynamics, Elsevier for the Society for Economic Dynamics, vol. 37, pages 234-254, July.
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    Cited by:

    1. Stefan Niemann & Paul Pichler, 2020. "Optimal fiscal policy and sovereign debt crises," Review of Economic Dynamics, Elsevier for the Society for Economic Dynamics, vol. 37, pages 234-254, July.

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    More about this item

    Keywords

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    JEL classification:

    • E62 - Macroeconomics and Monetary Economics - - Macroeconomic Policy, Macroeconomic Aspects of Public Finance, and General Outlook - - - Fiscal Policy; Modern Monetary Theory
    • F34 - International Economics - - International Finance - - - International Lending and Debt Problems
    • H63 - Public Economics - - National Budget, Deficit, and Debt - - - Debt; Debt Management; Sovereign Debt

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