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Race to the top in traffic calming

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  • Stef Proost
  • Jonas Westin

Abstract

We study the competition of two suburbs that are facing transit traffic flows. We show that in the absence of toll measures, the Nash equilibrium leads to a race to the top in traffic calming, except for the measures that do not affect the generalized cost of traffic. The Nash equilibrium is compared to two types of centralized decisions: the symmetric solution and the asymmetric solution. It is shown how the asymmetric solution that concentrates all transit traffic in one suburb is better but can only be realized if the authority over the local roads is transferred to the central authority.
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Suggested Citation

  • Stef Proost & Jonas Westin, 2017. "Race to the top in traffic calming," Papers in Regional Science, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 96(2), pages 401-422, June.
    • Handle: RePEc:bla:presci:v:96:y:2017:i:2:p:401-422
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    File URL: http://hdl.handle.net/10.1111/pirs.12196
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    References listed on IDEAS

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    1. De Borger, B. & Proost, S. & Van Dender, K., 2005. "Congestion and tax competition in a parallel network," European Economic Review, Elsevier, vol. 49(8), pages 2013-2040, November.
    2. Levinson, Arik, 2003. "Environmental Regulatory Competition: A Status Report and Some New Evidence," National Tax Journal, National Tax Association;National Tax Journal, vol. 56(1), pages 91-106, March.
    3. Saskia van der Loo & Stef Proost, 2013. "The European Road Pricing Game: How to Enforce Optimal Pricing in High-transit Countries under Asymmetric Information," Journal of Transport Economics and Policy, University of Bath, vol. 47(3), pages 399-418, September.
    4. Oates, Wallace E. & Schwab, Robert M., 1988. "Economic competition among jurisdictions: efficiency enhancing or distortion inducing?," Journal of Public Economics, Elsevier, vol. 35(3), pages 333-354, April.
    5. Bruno Borger & Stef Proost, 2016. "The political economy of pricing and capacity decisions for congestible local public goods in a federal state," International Tax and Public Finance, Springer;International Institute of Public Finance, vol. 23(5), pages 934-959, October.
    6. De Borger, Bruno & Proost, Stef, 2013. "Traffic externalities in cities: The economics of speed bumps, low emission zones and city bypasses," Journal of Urban Economics, Elsevier, vol. 76(C), pages 53-70.
    7. Levinson, Arik, 1999. "NIMBY taxes matter: the case of state hazardous waste disposal taxes," Journal of Public Economics, Elsevier, vol. 74(1), pages 31-51, October.
    8. De Borger, Bruno & Proost, Stef, 2012. "Transport policy competition between governments: A selective survey of the literature," Economics of Transportation, Elsevier, vol. 1(1), pages 35-48.
    9. Jonas Westin & Joel P. Franklin & Sofia Grahn-Voorneveld & Stef Proost, 2012. "How to decide on regional infrastructure to achieve intra-regional acceptability and inter-regional consensus?," Papers in Regional Science, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 91(3), pages 617-643, August.
    10. Besley, Timothy & Coate, Stephen, 2003. "Centralized versus decentralized provision of local public goods: a political economy approach," Journal of Public Economics, Elsevier, vol. 87(12), pages 2611-2637, December.
    11. Holzinger, Katharina & Knill, Christoph & Sommerer, Thomas, 2008. "Environmental Policy Convergence: The Impact of International Harmonization, Transnational Communication, and Regulatory Competition," International Organization, Cambridge University Press, vol. 62(4), pages 553-587, October.
    12. Guy D. Garrod & Riccardo Scarpa & Kenneth G. Willis, 2002. "Estimating the Benefits of Traffic Calming on Through Routes: A Choice Experiment Approach," Journal of Transport Economics and Policy, University of Bath, vol. 36(2), pages 211-231, May.
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    Cited by:

    1. Malik, Gaurav & Proost, Stef & M․J․ Tampère, Chris, 2025. "A game-theoretical model of road pricing with an endogenized user-equilibrium with multiple user classes," Transportation Research Part B: Methodological, Elsevier, vol. 195(C).
    2. De Borger, Bruno & Proost, Stef, 2021. "Road tolls, diverted traffic and local traffic calming measures: Who should be in charge?," Transportation Research Part B: Methodological, Elsevier, vol. 147(C), pages 92-115.

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    More about this item

    JEL classification:

    • H23 - Public Economics - - Taxation, Subsidies, and Revenue - - - Externalities; Redistributive Effects; Environmental Taxes and Subsidies
    • H77 - Public Economics - - State and Local Government; Intergovernmental Relations - - - Intergovernmental Relations; Federalism
    • Q58 - Agricultural and Natural Resource Economics; Environmental and Ecological Economics - - Environmental Economics - - - Environmental Economics: Government Policy
    • R41 - Urban, Rural, Regional, Real Estate, and Transportation Economics - - Transportation Economics - - - Transportation: Demand, Supply, and Congestion; Travel Time; Safety and Accidents; Transportation Noise
    • R48 - Urban, Rural, Regional, Real Estate, and Transportation Economics - - Transportation Economics - - - Government Pricing and Policy

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