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Sinnhaftigkeit und Effektivität der deutschen Schuldenbremse


  • Lars P. Feld


Since 2009 Germany has a new debt regime that requires the federal government to reduce its structural deficits to 0.35 percent of GDP until 2016 and the Länder to balance their budgets structurally until 2020. In this paper the rationale for a debt brake is discussed, the provisions of the new regime are summarized and its effectiveness is assessed. Although the new debt brake basically provides for a reasonable framework to achieve sustainable public finances, several loopholes remain that enable finance ministers to avoid fiscal consolidation. Particularly problematic are the provisions for the Länder which have incentives to appear excessively indebted until 2019 in order to negotiate better financial conditions in the fiscal equalization system that must be revised until 2019. These incentives may be stronger than the constitutional provision to reduce deficits. Copyright 2010 die Autoren. Perspektiven der Wirtschaftspolitik 2010 Verein für Socialpolitik.

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  • Lars P. Feld, 2010. "Sinnhaftigkeit und Effektivität der deutschen Schuldenbremse," Perspektiven der Wirtschaftspolitik, Verein für Socialpolitik, vol. 11(3), pages 226-245, August.
  • Handle: RePEc:bla:perwir:v:11:y:2010:i:3:p:226-245

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    References listed on IDEAS

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    Cited by:

    1. Eckhard Janeba, 2012. "Germany´s New Debt Brake: A Blueprint for Europe?," FinanzArchiv: Public Finance Analysis, Mohr Siebeck, Tübingen, vol. 68(4), pages 383-405, December.
    2. Christian F. Pfeil & Lars P. Feld, 2016. "Does the Swiss Debt Brake Induce Sound Federal Finances? A Synthetic Control Analysis," CESifo Working Paper Series 6044, CESifo Group Munich.
    3. Reischmann Markus, 2014. "Staatsverschuldung in Extrahaushalten: Historischer Überblick und Implikationen für die Schuldenbremse in Deutschland," Perspektiven der Wirtschaftspolitik, De Gruyter, vol. 15(2), pages 171-181, June.
    4. Hetschko, Clemens & Quint, Dominic & Thye, Marius, 2012. "Nationale Schuldenbremsen für die Länder der Europäischen Union: Taugt das deutsche Modell als Vorbild?," Discussion Papers 2012/12, Free University Berlin, School of Business & Economics.
    5. Heiko T. Burret & Lars P. Feld, 2013. "Fiscal Institutions in Germany," Swiss Journal of Economics and Statistics (SJES), Swiss Society of Economics and Statistics (SSES), vol. 149(II), pages 249-290, June.
    6. Burret, Heiko T. & Schnellenbach, Jan, 2013. "Umsetzung des Fiskalpakts im Euro-Raum: Expertise im Auftrag des Sachverständigenrates zur Begutachtung der gesamtwirtschaftlichen Entwicklung," Working Papers 08/2013, German Council of Economic Experts / Sachverständigenrat zur Begutachtung der gesamtwirtschaftlichen Entwicklung.
    7. Dilla, Diana, 2017. "Staatsverschuldung und Verschuldungsmentalität
      [Public Debt and Debt Mentality]
      ," MPRA Paper 79432, University Library of Munich, Germany.

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