IDEAS home Printed from https://ideas.repec.org/a/bla/pacecr/v14y2009i5p581-592.html
   My bibliography  Save this article

Do Depositors Respond Rationally To Bank Risks? Evidence From Japanese Banks During Crises

Author

Listed:
  • Masahiro Hori
  • Yasuaki Ito
  • Keiko Murata

Abstract

This paper empirically examines depositors' ability to distinguish healthy banks from problematic banks, a necessary condition for depositors to impose discipline on banking institutions. We analyzed a large panel of 784 deposit-taking institutions in Japan during the period from the 1992 financial year to the 2002 financial year. Our estimates indicate that depositors rightly appreciated the difference between healthy banks and risky banks, and that depositors of larger institutions are more sensitive to the bank risks than those of smaller institutions. We further argue that the estimated risk sensitivities of depositors are large enough to discipline the deposit-taking institutions. Copyright 2009 The Authors. Journal compilation 2009 Blackwell Publishing Asia Pty Ltd

Suggested Citation

  • Masahiro Hori & Yasuaki Ito & Keiko Murata, 2009. "Do Depositors Respond Rationally To Bank Risks? Evidence From Japanese Banks During Crises," Pacific Economic Review, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 14(5), pages 581-592, December.
  • Handle: RePEc:bla:pacecr:v:14:y:2009:i:5:p:581-592
    as

    Download full text from publisher

    File URL: http://www.blackwell-synergy.com/doi/abs/10.1111/j.1468-0106.2009.00470.x
    File Function: link to full text
    Download Restriction: Access to full text is restricted to subscribers.

    As the access to this document is restricted, you may want to search for a different version of it.

    References listed on IDEAS

    as
    1. Kam Hon Chu, 2003. "Deposit Insurance and Banking Crises in the Short and Long Run," Cato Journal, Cato Journal, Cato Institute, vol. 23(2), pages 265-280, Fall.
    2. Imai, Masami, 2006. "Market discipline and deposit insurance reform in Japan," Journal of Banking & Finance, Elsevier, vol. 30(12), pages 3433-3452, December.
    3. María Soledad Martínez-Peria & Sergio Schmukler, 2002. "Do Depositors Punish Banks for Bad Behavior? Market Discipline, Deposit Insurance, and Banking Crises," Central Banking, Analysis, and Economic Policies Book Series,in: Leonardo Hernández & Klaus Schmidt-Hebbel & Norman Loayza (Series Editor) & Klaus Schmidt-Hebbel (Se (ed.), Banking, Financial Integration, and International Crises, edition 1, volume 3, chapter 5, pages 143-174 Central Bank of Chile.
    4. Mark Flannery, 2001. "The Faces of “Market Discipline”," Journal of Financial Services Research, Springer;Western Finance Association, vol. 20(2), pages 107-119, October.
    Full references (including those not matched with items on IDEAS)

    Citations

    Citations are extracted by the CitEc Project, subscribe to its RSS feed for this item.
    as


    Cited by:

    1. Jacob Bikker & Dirk Gerritsen & Steffie Schwillens, 2016. "Competing for savings: how important is creditworthiness during the crisis?," DNB Working Papers 493, Netherlands Central Bank, Research Department.
    2. Meslier, Céline & Risfandy, Tastaftiyan & Tarazi, Amine, 2017. "Dual market competition and deposit rate setting in Islamic and conventional banks," Economic Modelling, Elsevier, vol. 63(C), pages 318-333.
    3. Allen Berger & Rima Turk-Ariss, 2015. "Do Depositors Discipline Banks and Did Government Actions During the Recent Crisis Reduce this Discipline? An International Perspective," Journal of Financial Services Research, Springer;Western Finance Association, vol. 48(2), pages 103-126, October.
    4. McQuinn, Kieran & Woods, Maria, 2012. "Modelling the corporate deposits of Irish financial institutions: 2009 - 2010," Research Technical Papers 02/RT/12, Central Bank of Ireland.
    5. Emmanuelle Nys & Amine Tarazi & Irwan Trinugroho, 2013. "Political Connections, Bank Deposits, and Formal Deposit Insurance: Evidence from an Emerging Economy," Working Papers hal-00916513, HAL.
    6. Nys, Emmanuelle & Tarazi, Amine & Trinugroho, Irwan, 2015. "Political connections, bank deposits, and formal deposit insurance," Journal of Financial Stability, Elsevier, vol. 19(C), pages 83-104.

    More about this item

    Statistics

    Access and download statistics

    Corrections

    All material on this site has been provided by the respective publishers and authors. You can help correct errors and omissions. When requesting a correction, please mention this item's handle: RePEc:bla:pacecr:v:14:y:2009:i:5:p:581-592. See general information about how to correct material in RePEc.

    For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: (Wiley-Blackwell Digital Licensing) or (Christopher F. Baum). General contact details of provider: http://www.blackwellpublishing.com/journal.asp?ref=1361-374X .

    If you have authored this item and are not yet registered with RePEc, we encourage you to do it here. This allows to link your profile to this item. It also allows you to accept potential citations to this item that we are uncertain about.

    If CitEc recognized a reference but did not link an item in RePEc to it, you can help with this form .

    If you know of missing items citing this one, you can help us creating those links by adding the relevant references in the same way as above, for each refering item. If you are a registered author of this item, you may also want to check the "citations" tab in your RePEc Author Service profile, as there may be some citations waiting for confirmation.

    Please note that corrections may take a couple of weeks to filter through the various RePEc services.

    IDEAS is a RePEc service hosted by the Research Division of the Federal Reserve Bank of St. Louis . RePEc uses bibliographic data supplied by the respective publishers.