IDEAS home Printed from https://ideas.repec.org/a/bla/jregsc/v47y2007i5p897-913.html
   My bibliography  Save this article

Tax Competition In The Presence Of Interjurisdictional Externalities: The Case Of Crime Prevention

Author

Listed:
  • Santiago M. Pinto

Abstract

ABSTRACT The paper analyzes the effect of fiscal competition when local governments choose the level of public goods that generate spillover effects elsewhere. For instance, law enforcement activities affect both the crime level in the jurisdiction providing the good and in neighboring communities. The model shows that when local governments rely on capital taxation to finance these expenditures the spillover effects may not lead to an inefficient provision of public goods as predicted by the tax competition literature. In the model, capital is costlessly mobile and offenders relocate responding to differential criminal opportunities and differential local law enforcement efforts.

Suggested Citation

  • Santiago M. Pinto, 2007. "Tax Competition In The Presence Of Interjurisdictional Externalities: The Case Of Crime Prevention," Journal of Regional Science, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 47(5), pages 897-913, December.
  • Handle: RePEc:bla:jregsc:v:47:y:2007:i:5:p:897-913
    DOI: 10.1111/j.1467-9787.2007.00535.x
    as

    Download full text from publisher

    File URL: https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1467-9787.2007.00535.x
    Download Restriction: no

    File URL: https://libkey.io/10.1111/j.1467-9787.2007.00535.x?utm_source=ideas
    LibKey link: if access is restricted and if your library uses this service, LibKey will redirect you to where you can use your library subscription to access this item
    ---><---

    References listed on IDEAS

    as
    1. Wellisch,Dietmar, 2000. "Theory of Public Finance in a Federal State," Cambridge Books, Cambridge University Press, number 9780521630351.
    Full references (including those not matched with items on IDEAS)

    Citations

    Citations are extracted by the CitEc Project, subscribe to its RSS feed for this item.
    as


    Cited by:

    1. Ligthart, J.E. & Rider, M. & Wang, R., 2013. "Does the Fiscal Decentralization Promote Public Safety? Evidence from United States," Other publications TiSEM 323ee27b-dcc9-4d82-9587-c, Tilburg University, School of Economics and Management.
    2. Nichols, Mark W. & Tosun, Mehmet Serkan, 2017. "The impact of legalized casino gambling on crime," Regional Science and Urban Economics, Elsevier, vol. 66(C), pages 1-15.
    3. Baumann, Florian & Friehe, Tim, 2013. "Private protection against crime when property value is private information," International Review of Law and Economics, Elsevier, vol. 35(C), pages 73-79.
    4. Peter Mayerhofer & Peter Huber, 2019. "Notwendigkeit und Möglichkeiten kooperativer Raum- und Wirtschaftsentwicklung in der Metropolregion Wien. Problemfelder, Handlungsoptionen, Umsetzungsmöglichkeiten," WIFO Studies, WIFO, number 69764.
    5. Carlos Augusto Olarte Bacares, 2014. "Criminality spread: a "Boomerang effect" of public transport improvements?," Documents de travail du Centre d'Economie de la Sorbonne 14013, Université Panthéon-Sorbonne (Paris 1), Centre d'Economie de la Sorbonne.
    6. Kangoh Lee & Santiago M. Pinto, 2009. "Crime In A Multi‐Jurisdictional Model With Private And Public Prevention," Journal of Regional Science, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 49(5), pages 977-996, December.
    7. Subhayu Bandyopadhyay & Santiago M. Pinto & Christopher H. Wheeler, 2011. "Urban Crime and Labor Mobility," Journal of Public Economic Theory, Association for Public Economic Theory, vol. 13(3), pages 443-462, June.
    8. Anping Chen & Marlon Boarnet & Mark Partridge & Yongzheng Liu & Jorge Martinez-Vazquez, 2014. "Interjurisdictional Tax Competition In China," Journal of Regional Science, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 54(4), pages 606-628, September.
    9. Mainali, Raju & Tosun, Mehmet Serkan & Yang, Jingjing, 2022. "Fiscal decentralization, intergovernmental transfer reform and conflict in Colombian municipalities," Socio-Economic Planning Sciences, Elsevier, vol. 83(C).
    10. Ahrend, Rudiger & Farchy, Emily & Kaplanis, Ioannis & Lembcke, Alexander C., 2015. "What makes cities more productive? Agglomeration economies and the role of urban governance: evidence from 5 OECD countries," LSE Research Online Documents on Economics 64619, London School of Economics and Political Science, LSE Library.
    11. George W. Hammond & Mehmet S. Tosun, 2011. "The Impact Of Local Decentralization On Economic Growth: Evidence From U.S. Counties," Journal of Regional Science, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 51(1), pages 47-64, February.
    12. Stephanie Armbruster & Beat Hintermann, 2020. "Decentralization with porous borders: public production in a federation with tax competition and spillovers," International Tax and Public Finance, Springer;International Institute of Public Finance, vol. 27(3), pages 606-642, June.
    13. Deepak Premkumar & Austin Quackenbush & Georgeanne Artz & Peter Orazem, 2013. "If You Build it, Will They Come?: Fiscal Federalism, Local Provision of Public Tourist Amenities, and the Vision Iowa Fund," The Review of Regional Studies, Southern Regional Science Association, vol. 43(2,3), pages 155-173, Winter.
    14. Carlos Augusto Olarte Bacares, 2013. "The criminality sprawl: The 'Boomerang effect' of public transport improvements," ERSA conference papers ersa13p1085, European Regional Science Association.
    15. Rudiger Ahrend & Emily Farchy & Ioannis Kaplanis & Alexander C. Lembcke, 2017. "What Makes Cities More Productive? Evidence From Five Oecd Countries On The Role Of Urban Governance," Journal of Regional Science, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 57(3), pages 385-410, June.
    16. Friehe, Tim & Pham, Cat Lam & Miceli, Thomas J., 2018. "Law enforcement in a federal system: Endogenous timing of decentralized enforcement effort," International Review of Law and Economics, Elsevier, vol. 56(C), pages 134-141.

    Most related items

    These are the items that most often cite the same works as this one and are cited by the same works as this one.
    1. Jean Gabszewicz & Ornella Tarola & Skerdilajda Zanaj, 2016. "Migration, wages and income taxes," International Tax and Public Finance, Springer;International Institute of Public Finance, vol. 23(3), pages 434-453, June.
    2. Kempf, Hubert & Rota-Graziosi, Grégoire, 2010. "Endogenizing leadership in tax competition," Journal of Public Economics, Elsevier, vol. 94(9-10), pages 768-776, October.
    3. Sung Hoon Kang & Mark Skidmore & Laura Reese, 2015. "The Effects of Changes in Property Tax Rates and School Spending on Residential and Business Property Value Growth," Real Estate Economics, American Real Estate and Urban Economics Association, vol. 43(2), pages 300-333, June.
    4. Hikaru Ogawa, 2010. "Fiscal Competition among Regional Governments - Tax Competition, Expenditure Competition and Externalities -," Public Policy Review, Policy Research Institute, Ministry of Finance Japan, vol. 6(1), pages 1-30, February.
    5. Wallace E. Oates & Wallace E. Oates, 2004. "Fiscal Competition and European Union: Contrasting Perspectives," Chapters, in: Environmental Policy and Fiscal Federalism, chapter 10, pages 182-194, Edward Elgar Publishing.
    6. Lars P. Feld & Horst Zimmermann & Thomas Döring, 2003. "Föderalismus, Dezentralität und Wirtschaftswachstum," Vierteljahrshefte zur Wirtschaftsforschung / Quarterly Journal of Economic Research, DIW Berlin, German Institute for Economic Research, vol. 72(3), pages 361-377.
    7. Gilles Duranton & Laurent Gobillon & Henry G. Overman, 2011. "Assessing the Effects of Local Taxation using Microgeographic Data," Economic Journal, Royal Economic Society, vol. 121(555), pages 1017-1046, September.
    8. Clemens Fuest & Alfons J. Weichenrieder & Alfons Weichenrieder, 2002. "Tax Competition and Profit Shifting: On the Relationship between Personal and Corporate Tax Rates," CESifo Working Paper Series 781, CESifo.
    9. Munongo, Simon & Akanbi, Olusegun Ayo & Robinson, Zurika, 2017. "Do tax incentives matter for investment? A literature review," Business and Economic Horizons (BEH), Prague Development Center (PRADEC), vol. 13(2).
    10. Levinson, Arik, 2003. "Environmental Regulatory Competition: A Status Report and Some New Evidence," National Tax Journal, National Tax Association;National Tax Journal, vol. 56(1), pages 91-106, March.
    11. Jean Hindriks & Gareth D. Myles, 2003. "Strategic Inter–Regional Transfers," Journal of Public Economic Theory, Association for Public Economic Theory, vol. 5(2), pages 229-248, April.
    12. Christopher Berry, 2008. "Piling On: Multilevel Government and the Fiscal Common‐Pool," American Journal of Political Science, John Wiley & Sons, vol. 52(4), pages 802-820, October.
    13. Krieger, Tim, 2005. "Renten und Zuwanderung: Ein Überblick über neue Ergebnisse der Forschung," Arbeitspapiere der Nordakademie 2005-04, Nordakademie - Hochschule der Wirtschaft.
    14. Fenge, Robert & Friese, Max, 2021. "Should unemployment insurance be centralized in a state union? Unearthing a principle of efficient federation building," Thuenen-Series of Applied Economic Theory 162, University of Rostock, Institute of Economics, revised 2021.
    15. Wildasin, David E., 2003. "Fiscal competition in space and time," Journal of Public Economics, Elsevier, vol. 87(11), pages 2571-2588, October.
    16. Matschke Xenia, 2003. "State Preferences and the Provision of Public Goods / Staatspräferenzen und die Bereitstellung öffentlicher Güter," Journal of Economics and Statistics (Jahrbuecher fuer Nationaloekonomie und Statistik), De Gruyter, vol. 223(6), pages 712-718, December.
    17. Ulrich Hange, 2008. "Tax Competition, Elastic Labor Supply, and Growth," CESifo Working Paper Series 2338, CESifo.
    18. Hikaru Ogawa & Mitsuhiro Yano, 2007. "Local Public Debt with Overlapping Generations," Economics of Governance, Springer, vol. 8(1), pages 51-59, January.
    19. Birner, Regina & Linacre, Nicholas A., 2008. "Designing Regional Systems of Biotechnology Regulation A Transaction Cost Approach to Regulatory Governance," 2007 Second International Conference, August 20-22, 2007, Accra, Ghana 52218, African Association of Agricultural Economists (AAAE).
    20. Volker Arnold, 2005. "Competitive Versus Cooperative Federalism: Is a Fiscal Equalization Scheme Necessary from an Allocative Point of View?/ Kompetitiver versus kooperativer Föderalismus: Ist ein horizontaler Finanzausgle," Journal of Economics and Statistics (Jahrbuecher fuer Nationaloekonomie und Statistik), De Gruyter, vol. 225(3), pages 259-282, June.

    More about this item

    Statistics

    Access and download statistics

    Corrections

    All material on this site has been provided by the respective publishers and authors. You can help correct errors and omissions. When requesting a correction, please mention this item's handle: RePEc:bla:jregsc:v:47:y:2007:i:5:p:897-913. See general information about how to correct material in RePEc.

    If you have authored this item and are not yet registered with RePEc, we encourage you to do it here. This allows to link your profile to this item. It also allows you to accept potential citations to this item that we are uncertain about.

    If CitEc recognized a bibliographic reference but did not link an item in RePEc to it, you can help with this form .

    If you know of missing items citing this one, you can help us creating those links by adding the relevant references in the same way as above, for each refering item. If you are a registered author of this item, you may also want to check the "citations" tab in your RePEc Author Service profile, as there may be some citations waiting for confirmation.

    For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: Wiley Content Delivery (email available below). General contact details of provider: http://www.blackwellpublishing.com/journal.asp?ref=0022-4146 .

    Please note that corrections may take a couple of weeks to filter through the various RePEc services.

    IDEAS is a RePEc service. RePEc uses bibliographic data supplied by the respective publishers.