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Länderautonomie in der Einkommensteuer: Konsequenzen eines Zuschlagsmodells

  • Thiess Büttner

    ()

    (ZEW Mannheim)

  • Robert Schwager

    ()

    (ZEW Mannheim)

Als mögliche Ausgestaltung einer Steuerautonomie der Länder wird ein Zuschlagsmodell bei der Einkommensteuer diskutiert. Anhand der tatsächlichen Aufkommenszahlen der letzten Jahre berechnete Projektionen zeigen, dass auch bei einer moderaten Reform entweder erhebliche Aufkommensdifferenzen oder stark divergierende Zuschlagssätze für die einzelnen Bundesländer zu erwarten wären. Falls die Politik vor diesem Hintergrund eine partielle Einbeziehung in den Finanzausgleich vorsieht, ist mit problematischen Rückwirkungen auf die Steuerpolitik der Länder zu rechnen. Während der horizontale Wettbewerb zwar tendenziell ein Sinken der Steuerlast herbeiführt, lösen die Beibehaltung des vertikalen Steuerverbunds und insbesondere die Einbettung in den Finanzausgleich Anreize zu einer übermäßigen Besteuerung aus.

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Article provided by Justus-Liebig University Giessen, Department of Statistics and Economics in its journal Journal of Economics and Statistics.

Volume (Year): 223 (2003)
Issue (Month): 5 ()
Pages: 532-555

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Handle: RePEc:jns:jbstat:v:223:y:2003:i:5:p:532-555
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