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Why cities should not be subsidized

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  • Fenge, Robert
  • Meier, Volker

Abstract

The paper deals with the question of whether fiscal transfers re-ceived by cities can be justified by a higher cost of producing publicly provided goods. In the model, increasing the population density implies both a higher output per capita due to agglomeration economies and a higher cost of the publicly provided good due to congestion. It is shown that introducing fiscal transfers to be paid by the region with the lower population density will generally reduce welfare. This result is obtained since the city is already beyond the level of optimum agglomeration.
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  • Fenge, Robert & Meier, Volker, 2002. "Why cities should not be subsidized," Journal of Urban Economics, Elsevier, vol. 52(3), pages 433-447, November.
    • Handle: RePEc:eee:juecon:v:52:y:2002:i:3:p:433-447
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    2. Albert Solé-Ollé & Núria Bosch, 2005. "On the Relationship between Authority Size and the Costs of Providing Local Services: Lessons for the Design of Intergovernmental Transfers in Spain," Public Finance Review, , vol. 33(3), pages 343-384, May.
    3. Eichhorst, Anja, 2007. "Evaluating the need assessment in fiscal equalization schemes at the local government level," Journal of Behavioral and Experimental Economics (formerly The Journal of Socio-Economics), Elsevier, vol. 36(5), pages 745-770, October.
    4. Violeta Vulovic, 2010. "The effect of sub-national borrowing control on fiscal sustainability: How to regulate?," Working Papers 2010/36, Institut d'Economia de Barcelona (IEB).
    5. John M. Clapp & Stephen L. Ross & Tingyu Zhou, 2019. "Retail Agglomeration and Competition Externalities: Evidence from Openings and Closings of Multiline Department Stores in the U.S," Journal of Business & Economic Statistics, Taylor & Francis Journals, vol. 37(1), pages 81-96, January.
    6. Albert Solé Ollé & Elisabet Viladecans Marsal, 2003. "Fiscal and growth spillovers in large urban areas," Working Papers 2003/1, Institut d'Economia de Barcelona (IEB).
    7. Albert Solé-Ollé & Elisabet Viladecans-Marsal, "undated". "Cities as engines of regional growth," Studies on the Spanish Economy 145, FEDEA.
    8. David Albouy, 2009. "What Are Cities Worth? Land Rents, Local Productivity, and the Capitalization of Amenity Values," NBER Working Papers 14981, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
    9. Buettner, Thiess & Holm-Hadulla, Fédéric, 2013. "City size and the demand for local public goods," Regional Science and Urban Economics, Elsevier, vol. 43(1), pages 16-21.
    10. Thiess Büttner & Fédéric Holm-Hadulla, 2008. "Cities in Fiscal Equalization," CESifo Working Paper Series 2447, CESifo.
    11. Albert Solé Ollé & Elisabet Viladecans Marsal, 2003. "Fiscal and growth spillovers in large urban areas," Working Papers 2003/1, Institut d'Economia de Barcelona (IEB).

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