Passive Industry Interests in a Large Polity
We seek to explain the puzzle of passive industry interests. Taking the formation decision as given, we focus on the ability of a political action committee (PAC) to elicit voluntary donations for campaign giving. We show that, when the number of stakeholders is large and uncertain, PACs behave counteractively. That is, a single PAC that does not oppose the government's prior preference raises resources whenever an opponent poses a credible threat to secure policy favors. By implication money never actually changes hands, prompting the suggestion that counteractive behavior may lie behind the well-documented, and consistently low, levels of PAC disbursements. Copyright 2006 Blackwell Publishing, Inc..
If you experience problems downloading a file, check if you have the proper application to view it first. In case of further problems read the IDEAS help page. Note that these files are not on the IDEAS site. Please be patient as the files may be large.
As the access to this document is restricted, you may want to look for a different version under "Related research" (further below) or search for a different version of it.
Volume (Year): 8 (2006)
Issue (Month): 4 (October)
|Contact details of provider:|| Web page: http://www.blackwellpublishing.com/journal.asp?ref=1097-3923|
More information through EDIRC
|Order Information:||Web: http://www.blackwellpublishing.com/subs.asp?ref=1097-3923|