Does Reputation Contribute to Reducing Organizational Errors? A Learning Approach

In this study I examine the effect of a firm's reputation for product quality on its effort in learning to reduce its product defect rate. Theoretical ideas on the motivation of learning associated with social aspiration levels and the self‐serving bias combined with social categorization suggest that poor quality reputation firms are more likely than their counterparts with a good reputation to attend to potential product defects and consequently reduce their defect rate. However, a stream of research on the motivation of learning stemming from historical aspiration levels and slack search leads to a different argument: a reputation for good quality is more likely to provide firms with a motivation to avoid product defects. I build upon these two competing arguments and hypothesize that stronger motives for learning exist in situations where firms have either a weak or strong reputation for product quality. My study of product recalls in the US automotive industry highlights an inverted U‐shaped relationship, indicating the liability of an intermediate reputation in reducing product defects.