Entry Deterrence, Product Quality: Price and Advertising as Signals
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- Laurent Linnemer, 1998. "Entry Deterrence, Product Quality: Price and Advertising as Signals," Post-Print hal-01629766, HAL.
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- Fluet, Claude & Garella, Paolo G., 2002.
"Advertising and prices as signals of quality in a regime of price rivalry,"
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- Kretschmer, Tobias & Rösner, Mariana, 2010. "Increasing Dominance - the Role of Advertising, Pricing and Product Design," Discussion Papers in Business Administration 11500, University of Munich, Munich School of Management.
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"Competition and confidentiality: Signaling quality in a duopoly when there is universal private information,"
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- Bontems, Philippe & Mahenc, Philippe, 2014. "Signaling quality in vertical relationships," TSE Working Papers 14-467, Toulouse School of Economics (TSE).
- Kyle Bagwell, 2007. "Signalling and entry deterrence: a multidimensional analysis," RAND Journal of Economics, RAND Corporation, vol. 38(3), pages 670-697, September.
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- Laurent Linnemer, 2011. "Caught In A Stranglehold? Advertising: What Else?," Manchester School, University of Manchester, vol. 79(1), pages 63-80, January.
- Alex Barrachina & Yair Tauman & Amparo Urbano Salvador, 2014. "Entry with Two Correlated Signals," Discussion Papers in Economic Behaviour 0714, University of Valencia, ERI-CES.
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- Andrew F. Daughety & Jennifer F. Reinganum, 2003. "Secrecy and Safety," Vanderbilt University Department of Economics Working Papers 0317, Vanderbilt University Department of Economics, revised Sep 2003.
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"Union-oligopoly bargaining and entry deterrence: a reassessment of limit pricing,"
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- Rupayan Pal & Bibhas Saha, 2008. "Union-Oligopoly Bargaining and Entry Deterrence:A Reassessment of Limit Pricing," Working Papers id:1375, eSocialSciences.
- Francesca Barigozzi & Paolo G. Garella & Martin Peitz, 2009.
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- Francesca BARIGOZZI & Paolo Giorgio GARELLA & Martin PEITZ, 2008. "With a little help from my enemy: comparative advertising as a signal of quality," Departmental Working Papers 2008-31, Department of Economics, Management and Quantitative Methods at Università degli Studi di Milano.
- Meng, Dawen & Tian, Guoqiang, 2013. "Entry-Deterring Nonlinear Pricing with Bounded Rationality," MPRA Paper 57935, University Library of Munich, Germany, revised May 2014.
- Peter-J. Jost & Stefanie Schubert & Miriam Zschoche, 2015. "Incumbent positioning as a determinant of strategic response to entry," Small Business Economics, Springer, vol. 44(3), pages 577-596, March.
- Utaka, Atsuo, 2008. "Pricing strategy, quality signaling, and entry deterrence," International Journal of Industrial Organization, Elsevier, vol. 26(4), pages 878-888, July.
- Pei-Cheng Liao, 2014. "Input Prices as Signals of Costs to a Downstream Rival and Customer," The Japanese Economic Review, Japanese Economic Association, vol. 65(3), pages 414-430, September.
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