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Analyse économique de la notion de prix de prédation

Listed author(s):
  • Patrick Rey
  • Jean Tirole

[eng] This note aims at clarifying the debate on « abnormally low prices », where many arguments rely on predatory pricing behaviour. It thus offers a survey of : —predatory pricing theory, —detection problems (are they different from collusion or dominant position detection problems ?) —prédation in competition law and policy. The first part of this note thus surveys the existing literature on predatory pricing. Its implications for competition policy are then discussed. The concluding section gathers the economic arguments that have been presented and, in the light of the French competition law, offers some comments that may help clarifying the debate. [fre] Cette note vise à éclairer le débat sur la notion de prix anormalement bas, les arguments avancés à ce propos recoupant notamment ce qu'il est convenu d'appeler des pratiques de prédation. En conséquence, il est proposé une synthèse sur : —la notion de prix de prédation, —ses problèmes de détection (peut-on l'appréhender indépendamment du constat d'une entente ou d'une position dominante ?) —les conditions de son appréhension, d'un point de vue économique, dans le droit de la concurrence. La première partie offre donc une synthèse de la littérature existante relative à la théorie économique de la notion de prix de prédation. Il en est ensuite discuté les implications en matière de politique de la concurrence. La conclusion rassemble les arguments évoqués et, à la lumière de la législation française actuelle, propose plusieurs conclusions susceptibles d'éclairer utilement le débat.

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Article provided by Programme National Persée in its journal Revue française d'économie.

Volume (Year): 12 (1997)
Issue (Month): 1 ()
Pages: 3-32

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Handle: RePEc:prs:rfreco:rfeco_0769-0479_1997_num_12_1_1013
Note: DOI:10.3406/rfeco.1997.1013
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  1. A. Michael Spence, 1977. "Entry, Capacity, Investment and Oligopolistic Pricing," Bell Journal of Economics, The RAND Corporation, vol. 8(2), pages 534-544, Autumn.
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