Advertising and endogenous exit in a differentiated duopoly
In this paper we consider a two-stage duopoly game where fîrrns first decide whether to invest in advertising and then compete in prices. Advertising has two effects : a market enlargement for both firms and a predatory gain for the investing firm only. Both symmetric and asymmetric equilibria may arise. The two most interesting cases are a coordination game where both firms investing and non-investing are equilibria. and a chicken game where only one firm invests while the other is possibly driven (endogenously) out of the market. Our results suggest that product differentiation has an ambiguous impact on investinent in advertising and that strong product substitutability may induce a coordination problem.
|Date of creation:||01 Mar 2006|
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