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Advertising and Oligopolistic Equilibrium

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  • James W. Friedman

Abstract

This article analyzes advertising in an n-firm infinite horizon, differentiated products oligopoly. The firms all choose output and advertising levels in each period, and are assumed to behave noncooperatively. Advertising is characterized in a manner similar to capital: the effects of money spent on advertising today last well into the future. The interfirm advertising effect can be either cooperative or predatory, and in a linear-quadratic version of the model, this degree of cooperativeness is represented by a parameter. Existence and uniqueness of the Nash equilibrium are obtained, along with many comparative statics results.

Suggested Citation

  • James W. Friedman, 1983. "Advertising and Oligopolistic Equilibrium," Bell Journal of Economics, The RAND Corporation, vol. 14(2), pages 464-473, Autumn.
  • Handle: RePEc:rje:bellje:v:14:y:1983:i:autumn:p:464-473
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    References listed on IDEAS

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    1. Samet, Dov & Tauman, Yair, 1982. "The Determination of Marginal Cost Prices under a Set of Axioms," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 50(4), pages 895-909, July.
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    Cited by:

    1. Dubois, Pierre & Griffith, Rachel & O'Connell, Martin, 2014. "The Effects of Banning Advertising on Demand, Supply and Welfare: Structural Estimation on a Junk Food Market," TSE Working Papers 14-485, Toulouse School of Economics (TSE).
    2. Andrea Mantovani & Giordano Mion, 2006. "Advertising and endogenous exit in a differentiated duopoly," Recherches économiques de Louvain, De Boeck Université, vol. 72(1), pages 19-48.
    3. Benedetto Molinari & Francesco Turino, 2009. "Advertising and Business Cycle Fluctuations," Working Papers. Serie AD 2009-09, Instituto Valenciano de Investigaciones Económicas, S.A. (Ivie).
    4. Massimo Motta, 2013. "Advertising bans," SERIEs: Journal of the Spanish Economic Association, Springer;Spanish Economic Association, vol. 4(1), pages 61-81, March.
    5. Changying Li & Jianhu Zhang, 2013. "Dynamic Games of R&D Competition in a Differentiated Duopoly," Journal of Institutional and Theoretical Economics (JITE), Mohr Siebeck, Tübingen, vol. 169(4), pages 660-679, December.
    6. Lakdawalla, Darius & Sood, Neeraj & Gu, Qian, 2013. "Pharmaceutical advertising and Medicare Part D," Journal of Health Economics, Elsevier, vol. 32(6), pages 1356-1367.
    7. Lambertini, Luca & Zaccour, Georges, 2015. "Inverted-U aggregate investment curves in a dynamic game of advertising," Economics Letters, Elsevier, vol. 132(C), pages 34-38.
    8. Bagwell Kyle & Lee Gea M., 2010. "Advertising Collusion in Retail Markets," The B.E. Journal of Economic Analysis & Policy, De Gruyter, vol. 10(1), pages 1-54, August.
    9. Harrison, Teresa & Laincz, Chris, 2013. "Nonprofits, Crowd-Out, and Credit Constraints," School of Economics Working Paper Series 2013-5, LeBow College of Business, Drexel University.
    10. Mesak, Hani I. & Bari, Abdullahel & Blackstock, Rob, 2016. "On the robustness and strategic implications of a parsimonious advertising – inventory competitive model with extensions to pricing competition," International Journal of Production Economics, Elsevier, vol. 180(C), pages 38-47.
    11. Erickson, Gary M., 1995. "Differential game models of advertising competition," European Journal of Operational Research, Elsevier, vol. 83(3), pages 431-438, June.
    12. Adam Hoffer & Brad R. Humphreys & Donald J. Lacombe & Jane E. Ruseski, 2014. "The NCAA Athletics Arms Race: Theory and Evidence," Working Papers 14-29, Department of Economics, West Virginia University.
    13. Webb, Natalie J., 1996. "Corporate profits and social responsibility: "Subsidization" of corporate income under charitable giving tax laws," Journal of Economics and Business, Elsevier, vol. 48(4), pages 401-421, October.
    14. Feng Yao, 2012. "The Effect of Advertising on Collusion in the U.S. Brewing Industry: A Trigger Strategy Approach," Atlantic Economic Journal, Springer;International Atlantic Economic Society, vol. 40(1), pages 21-37, March.
    15. Richard Schmidtke, 2006. "Private Provision of a Complementary Public Good," Working Papers 004, Bavarian Graduate Program in Economics (BGPE).
    16. Griffith, Rachel & Krol, Michal & Smith, Kate, 2015. "Store Brands and the Role of Advertising," CEPR Discussion Papers 10877, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers.
    17. Ram Bala & Pradeep Bhardwaj, 2010. "Detailing vs. Direct-to-Consumer Advertising in the Prescription Pharmaceutical Industry," Management Science, INFORMS, vol. 56(1), pages 148-160, January.
    18. Yohei Tenryu & Keita Kamei, 2014. "Dynamic Voluntary Advertising under Partial Market Coverage," KIER Working Papers 909, Kyoto University, Institute of Economic Research.
    19. Mesak, Hani I. & Bari, Abdullahel & Luehlfing, Michael S. & Han, Fei, 2015. "On modeling the advertising-operations interface under asymmetric competition," European Journal of Operational Research, Elsevier, vol. 240(1), pages 278-291.
    20. Tenryu, Yohei & Kamei, Keita, 2014. "Welfare Analysis of Dynamic Voluntary Advertising in Covered Markets," MPRA Paper 60694, University Library of Munich, Germany.
    21. repec:eee:touman:v:57:y:2016:i:c:p:323-333 is not listed on IDEAS
    22. Aust, Gerhard & Buscher, Udo, 2014. "Cooperative advertising models in supply chain management: A review," European Journal of Operational Research, Elsevier, vol. 234(1), pages 1-14.
    23. repec:eee:eecrev:v:100:y:2017:i:c:p:116-142 is not listed on IDEAS

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