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The Incidental Fortress: The Single European Market and World Trade

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  • Alasdair R. Young

Abstract

The European Union's role in international trade contains two significant contradictions: first, although its trade policy, with some notable exceptions, is generally fairly liberal, it has been the respondent in a number of high-profile trade disputes; second, al though a champion of multilateralism, the EU has had problems complying with World Trade Organization (WTO) judgments. I argue that these contradictions in the EU's trading persona are due to the internal dynamics of European policy-making, which create 'regulatory peaks' where the member governments' rules diverge, and render the resulting rules difficult to alter. Copyright Blackwell Publishing Ltd 2004.

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  • Alasdair R. Young, 2004. "The Incidental Fortress: The Single European Market and World Trade," Journal of Common Market Studies, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 42(2), pages 393-414, June.
  • Handle: RePEc:bla:jcmkts:v:42:y:2004:i:2:p:393-414
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    References listed on IDEAS

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    1. Kimberly Ann Elliott & Thomas O. Bayard, 1994. "Reciprocity and Retaliation in U.S. Trade Policy," Peterson Institute Press: All Books, Peterson Institute for International Economics, number 78.
    2. World Bank, 2000. "Global Economic Prospects and the Developing Countries 2000," World Bank Publications, The World Bank, number 14776.
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    Cited by:

    1. Cornelia Woll, 2009. "Who Captures Whom? Trade Policy Lobbying in the European Union," Post-Print hal-00972851, HAL.
    2. Toro, Francisco P., 2008. "Agenda Disputes and Strategic Venue Preferences: The Doha Crisis and Europe’s Flight to Regionalism," MERIT Working Papers 048, United Nations University - Maastricht Economic and Social Research Institute on Innovation and Technology (MERIT).
    3. Gerrit Faber & Jan Orbie, 2009. "Everything But Arms: Much More than Appears at First Sight," Journal of Common Market Studies, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 47, pages 767-787, September.
    4. Cornelia Woll, 2006. "Trade Policy Lobbying in the European Union: Who Captures Whom?," Sciences Po publications 06/7, Sciences Po.
    5. Cornelia Woll, 2009. "Who Captures Whom? Trade Policy Lobbying in the European Union," Sciences Po publications info:hdl:2441/f5vtl5h9a73, Sciences Po.
    6. Arlo Poletti & Daniela Sicurelli, 2016. "The European Union, Preferential Trade Agreements, and the International Regulation of Sustainable Biofuels," Journal of Common Market Studies, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 54(2), pages 249-266, March.
    7. Cornelia Woll, 2006. "Trade Policy Lobbying in the European Union: Who Captures Whom?," Working Papers hal-00972822, HAL.

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