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Is There One Best Way to Sell a Company? Auctions Versus Negotiations and Controlled Sales1

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  • Audra L. Boone
  • J. Harold Mulherin

Abstract

For managements and boards that have decided that the value‐maximizing choice is to sell their companies, the board must then address another important question: what is the best way to sell the company? Should they use a wide‐ranging auction that seeks to attract the largest number of bidders, exclusive negotiation with a single bidder, or a “controlled sale” with a limited group of potential buyers? In a much cited 1996 article in the American Economic Review called “Auctions Versus Negotiations,” economists Jeremy Bulow and Paul Klemperer argued that there is “no merit in arguments that negotiation should be restricted to one or a few bidders to allow the seller to maintain control of the negotiating process.” But in their series of studies of the corporate M&A sales process over the past five years, the authors of this article have come to a very different conclusion. Contrary to the conventional wisdom, wide‐ranging auctions that seek the greatest number of bidders are far from the dominant approach. Roughly half of the large M&A deals investigated by the authors were accomplished through negotiations with single bidders. At the same time, full‐fledged auctions accounted for only about half of the deals involving multiple bidders, while the other half were classified as controlled sales aimed at a small number of carefully selected potential buyers. In their attempt to explain this preference for negotiations and controlled sales over auctions in M&A sales, the authors draw extensive parallels with the market for initial public offerings. As in the “bookbuilding” approach that now dominates the IPO process in virtually all global capital markets, the decision to limit the number of bidders through either negotiations or controlled sales appears to have the advantage of eliciting more aggressive bids from the “most qualified” buyers. Or, to put this another way, auctions appear to have the effect of discouraging such buyers from participating in the process.

Suggested Citation

  • Audra L. Boone & J. Harold Mulherin, 2009. "Is There One Best Way to Sell a Company? Auctions Versus Negotiations and Controlled Sales1," Journal of Applied Corporate Finance, Morgan Stanley, vol. 21(3), pages 28-37, June.
  • Handle: RePEc:bla:jacrfn:v:21:y:2009:i:3:p:28-37
    DOI: 10.1111/j.1745-6622.2009.00237.x
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    References listed on IDEAS

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    Cited by:

    1. Chira, Inga & Volkov, Nikanor, 2017. "The choice of sale method and its consequences in mergers and acquisitions," The Quarterly Review of Economics and Finance, Elsevier, vol. 63(C), pages 170-184.
    2. Jurich, Stephen N. & Walker, M. Mark, 2019. "What drives merger outcomes?," The North American Journal of Economics and Finance, Elsevier, vol. 48(C), pages 757-775.
    3. Liu, Tingting & Mulherin, J. Harold, 2018. "How has takeover competition changed over time?," Journal of Corporate Finance, Elsevier, vol. 49(C), pages 104-119.
    4. Fidrmuc, Jana P. & Roosenboom, Peter & Paap, Richard & Teunissen, Tim, 2012. "One size does not fit all: Selling firms to private equity versus strategic acquirers," Journal of Corporate Finance, Elsevier, vol. 18(4), pages 828-848.
    5. Calcagno, Riccardo & Falconieri, Sonia, 2014. "Competition and dynamics of takeover contests," Journal of Corporate Finance, Elsevier, vol. 26(C), pages 36-56.
    6. Fidrmuc, Jana P. & Xia, Chunling, 2019. "M&A deal initiation and managerial motivation," Journal of Corporate Finance, Elsevier, vol. 59(C), pages 320-343.
    7. Stephan Lauermann & Asher Wolinsky, 2024. "Auctions with Frictions: Recruitment, Entry, and Limited Commitment," ECONtribute Discussion Papers Series 288, University of Bonn and University of Cologne, Germany.
    8. Tarsalewska, Monika, 2018. "Buyouts under the threat of preemption," Journal of Banking & Finance, Elsevier, vol. 89(C), pages 39-58.
    9. Crifo, Patricia & Forget, Vanina D. & Teyssier, Sabrina, 2015. "The price of environmental, social and governance practice disclosure: An experiment with professional private equity investors," Journal of Corporate Finance, Elsevier, vol. 30(C), pages 168-194.
    10. Becker, Jan U. & Clement, Michel & Nöth, Markus, 2016. "Start-ups, incumbents, and the effects of takeover competition," Journal of Business Research, Elsevier, vol. 69(12), pages 5925-5933.
    11. Mengyao Kang, 2022. "Credit rating downgrade risk and acquisition decisions," Journal of Business Finance & Accounting, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 49(5-6), pages 1011-1073, May.
    12. Jurich, Stephen N. & Walker, M. Mark, 2022. "Initiating contact in merger negotiations: Who leads and who follows?," Journal of Economics and Business, Elsevier, vol. 119(C).
    13. Aleksander Buczek, 2016. "The time to completion of a legal merger: General concepts, statistical analysis and the case of Poland," Operations Research and Decisions, Wroclaw University of Science and Technology, Faculty of Management, vol. 26(1), pages 19-44.
    14. Joosung Lee & Daniel Z. Li, 2018. "Sequential Search Auctions with a Deadline," Working Papers 2018_03, Durham University Business School.
    15. Patricia Crifo & Vanina Forget & Sabrina Teyssier, 2012. "The price of unsustainability: An experiment with professional private equity investors," Working Papers hal-00757203, HAL.
    16. J. Mulherin & Kiplan Womack, 2015. "Competition, Auctions & Negotiations in REIT Takeovers," The Journal of Real Estate Finance and Economics, Springer, vol. 50(2), pages 151-180, February.

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