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Optimal Liquidity Provision Through a Demand Deposit Scheme: The Jacklin Critique Revisited

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  • Alexander Zimper

Abstract

We derive conditions such that optimal liquidity provisions through a demand deposit scheme can be sustainably implemented in a subgame perfect Nash equilibrium under the assumption that renegade investors have free access to ex-post asset markets. As our qualitative main finding we demonstrate that such sustainability is more likely for poor than for rich scheme participants in terms of future income. By establishing sustainability for low future income populations, our formal analysis therefore offers an important qualification of Jacklin's(1987) influential claim that an optimal demand deposit scheme is not sustainable whenever there exists the possibility of an ex-post asset market.
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  • Alexander Zimper, 2013. "Optimal Liquidity Provision Through a Demand Deposit Scheme: The Jacklin Critique Revisited," German Economic Review, Verein für Socialpolitik, vol. 14(1), pages 89-107, February.
  • Handle: RePEc:bla:germec:v:14:y:2013:i:1:p:89-107
    DOI: 10.1111/j.1468-0475.2012.0566.x
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    Cited by:

    1. Alexander Zimper, 2015. "Bank-Deposit Contracts Versus Financial-Market Participation in Emerging Economies," Emerging Markets Finance and Trade, Taylor & Francis Journals, vol. 51(3), pages 525-536, May.
    2. Zimper, Alexander, 2016. "Banks versus markets. A response to Kucinskas," Economics Letters, Elsevier, vol. 147(C), pages 174-176.

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    More about this item

    JEL classification:

    • D82 - Microeconomics - - Information, Knowledge, and Uncertainty - - - Asymmetric and Private Information; Mechanism Design
    • G21 - Financial Economics - - Financial Institutions and Services - - - Banks; Other Depository Institutions; Micro Finance Institutions; Mortgages
    • G32 - Financial Economics - - Corporate Finance and Governance - - - Financing Policy; Financial Risk and Risk Management; Capital and Ownership Structure; Value of Firms; Goodwill

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