The Impact of Enterprise Size on Employment Tribunal Incidence and Outcomes: Evidence from Britain
Employment Tribunals are the formal means of adjudicating disputes over individual employment rights in the UK. This article hypothesizes that, because small firms favour informality over formality, they are more likely (i) to experience employee claims than large firms; (ii) to be subject to different types of claims; (iii) to settle prior to reaching a formal Tribunal; and (iv) to lose at a Tribunal. Data from the 2003 Survey of Employment Tribunal Applications are used to examine these hypotheses. They are generally supported, although in relation to the third there was no size effect. Furthermore, our results show that firms that have procedures and follow them are more likely to win than those firms that do not have any procedures. Recognizing the benefits of informality, while also ensuring that small firms follow proper standards of procedural fairness, is a policy dilemma that has yet to be resolved. Copyright (c) Blackwell Publishing Ltd/London School of Economics 2008.
If you experience problems downloading a file, check if you have the proper application to view it first. In case of further problems read the IDEAS help page. Note that these files are not on the IDEAS site. Please be patient as the files may be large.
As the access to this document is restricted, you may want to look for a different version under "Related research" (further below) or search for a different version of it.
Volume (Year): 46 (2008)
Issue (Month): 3 (09)
|Contact details of provider:|| Postal: |
Phone: +44 (020) 7405 7686
Web page: http://www.blackwellpublishing.com/journal.asp?ref=0007-1080
More information through EDIRC
|Order Information:||Web: http://www.blackwellpublishing.com/subs.asp?ref=0007-1080|
When requesting a correction, please mention this item's handle: RePEc:bla:brjirl:v:46:y:2008:i:3:p:469-499. See general information about how to correct material in RePEc.
For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: (Wiley-Blackwell Digital Licensing)or (Christopher F. Baum)
If you have authored this item and are not yet registered with RePEc, we encourage you to do it here. This allows to link your profile to this item. It also allows you to accept potential citations to this item that we are uncertain about.
If references are entirely missing, you can add them using this form.
If the full references list an item that is present in RePEc, but the system did not link to it, you can help with this form.
If you know of missing items citing this one, you can help us creating those links by adding the relevant references in the same way as above, for each refering item. If you are a registered author of this item, you may also want to check the "citations" tab in your profile, as there may be some citations waiting for confirmation.
Please note that corrections may take a couple of weeks to filter through the various RePEc services.