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Indirect Effects of an Aid Program: How Do Cash Transfers Affect Ineligibles' Consumption?

  • Manuela Angelucci
  • Giacomo De Giorgi

Cash transfers to eligible households indirectly increase the consumption of ineligible households living in the same villages. This effect operates through insurance and credit markets: ineligible households benefit from the transfers by receiving more gifts and loans and by reducing their savings. Thus, the transfers benefit the local economy at large; looking only at the effect on the treated underestimates their impact. One should analyze the effects of this class of programs on the entire local economy, rather than on the treated only, and use a village-level randomization, rather than selecting treatment nd control subjects from the same community. (JEL H23, I38, O12, O15)

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Article provided by American Economic Association in its journal American Economic Review.

Volume (Year): 99 (2009)
Issue (Month): 1 (March)
Pages: 486-508

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Handle: RePEc:aea:aecrev:v:99:y:2009:i:1:p:486-508
Note: DOI: 10.1257/aer.99.1.486
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    • Francis Bloch (GREQAM and Universite de la Mediterranee), Garance Genicot (Georgetown University, and Debraj Ray (New York University and Instituto de Analisis Economico (CSIC)), 2004. "Informal Insurance in Social Networks," Working Papers gueconwpa~04-04-16, Georgetown University, Department of Economics.
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