# David K. Levine

# Levine's Working Paper Archive

**Contact information of David K. Levine:**

Web page: http://www.dklevine.com/

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### 1998

**625 Inflation and Reputation***by*D. Backus & J. Driffil**618 Repeated Principal Agent Games With Discounting***by*R. Radner**617 Monitoring Cooperative Agreements in a Repeated Principal-Agent Relationship***by*R. Radner**608 Repeated Games with Long-run and Short-run Players***by*D. Fudenberg & D. M. Kreps & E. Maskin**603 Monopoly and Credibility in Asset Markets***by*D. Fudenberg & D. K. Levine**602 Reputation Acquisition in Debt Markets***by*Douglas W. Diamond**600 Sustainable Plans***by*V. V. Chari & Patrick J Kehoe**451 Considerations of fairness and strategy: experimental data from sequential games***by*V. Prasnikar & A. Roth**445 On the Strategic Stability of Equilibria***by*E. Kohlberg & J.-F. Mertens**344 Bargaining and market behavior in Jerusalem, Liubljana, Pittsburgh and Tokyo: an experimental study***by*Alvin E. Roth & V. Prasnikar & M. Okuno-Fujiwara & S. Zamir**331 An experimental study of sequential bargaining***by*J. Ochs & Alvin E. Roth**299 An experimental evaluation of weakest link/best shot models of public goods***by*Glen W. Harrison & Jack Hirshleifer**245 Limit Pricing and Entry Under Incomplete Information: An Equilibrium Analysis***by*Paul Milgrom & John Roberts**237 Sequential Equilibria***by*David Kreps & Robert Wilson**224 The Folk Theorem for Repeated Games with Discounting and Incomplete Information***by*Drew Fudenberg & Eric Maskin**2222 Learning in Games***by*Drew Fudenberg & David K. Levine**2138 Evolution and Information in a Prisoner's Dilemma Game***by*Phillip Johnson & David K Levine & Wolfgang Pesendorfer**209 Sovereign Debt: Is to Forgive to Forget***by*Jeremy Bulow & Kenneth Rogoff**2065 Learning by Doing and the Choice of Technology***by*Larry Karp & In Ho Lee**2062 Competitive Equilibria with Asymmetric Information***by*Alberto Bisin & Piero Gottardi**2060 Strategy and Equity: An ERC Analysis of the Guth-van Damme Game***by*Gary E. Bolton & Axel Ockenfels**2055 The Monetary Transmission Mechanism***by*Jess Benhabib & Roger Farmer**114 Self-Fulfilling Debt Crises***by*Harold L. Cole & Timothy J. Kehoe

### 1997

**912 Valuation equilibrium with Clubs***by*Harold L Cole & Edward C Prescott**896 Signaling Games and Stable Equilibria***by*In-Koo Cho & David M. Kreps**845 Laws of Large Numbers for Dynamical Systems with Random Matched Individuals***by*Richard T. Boylan**792 Testing Non-Cooperative Bargaining Theory: A Preliminary Study***by*Ken Binmore & A. Shaked & J. Sutton**771 Evolution with state-dependent Mutations***by*J Bergin & B L Lipman**672 Giving according to GARP: an experimental study of rationality and altruism***by*James Andreoni & John H Miller**671 Warm-glow versus cold-prickle: the effect of positive and negative framing on cooperation in experiments***by*James Andreoni**670 Rational Cooperation in the finitely repeated prisoner's dilemma: experimental evidence***by*James Andreoni & John H Miller**648 Asset Returns with transaction costs and uninsured individual risk***by*S Rao Aiyagari & Mark Gertler**636 Information and timing in repeated partnerships***by*Dilip Abreu & Paul Milgrom & David Pearce**633 Folk Theorems for Repeated Games: A NEU Condition***by*Dilip Abreu & Prajit K Dutta & Lones Smith**632 Optimal Cartel Equilibria with Imperfect monitoring***by*Dilip Abreu & David Pearce & Ennio Stacchetti**629 Learning in the Stock Flow Model***by*David K. Levine**598 Loss of Commitment? An Evolutionary Analysis of Bagwell’s Example***by*Jörg Oechssler & Karl H Schlag**597 Learning to Perfect Manipulation: Implications for Fertility, Savings, and Old-Age Social Security***by*Lakshmi K Raut**596 Robust Permanent Income and Pricing***by*Lars Peter Hansen & Thomas J. Sargent & Thomas D. Tallarini Jr.**595 Learning and Implementation on the Internet***by*Eric J Friedman & Scott Schenker**594 Fairness in Ultimatum Games with Heterogeneous Receivers***by*Jeffrey E Prisbey**593 Game Theory, On-line Prediction and Boosting***by*Yoav Freund & Robert E Shapire**592 Does Observation of Others Affect Learning in Strategic Environments? An Experimental Study***by*John Duffy & Nick Feltovich**591 A proof of Calibration via Blackwell's Approachability Theorem***by*Dean P Foster**590 Predicting a binary sequence almost as well as the optimal biased coin***by*Yoav Freund**588 Using co-evolutionary programming to simulate strategic behaviour in markets***by*Tony Curson Price**509 Public Goods: A Survey of Experimental Research***by*J. Ledyard**471 Conditional Universal Consistency***by*Drew Fudenberg & David K. Levine**2047 Modeling Altruism and Spitefulness in Experiments***by*David K Levine**1987 Reputation with Noisy Precommitment***by*David K. Levine & Cesar Martinelli**1908 On the Impossibility of Informationally Efficient Markets***by*Sanford J Grossman & Joseph E Stiglitz**1889 A Theory of Equity, Reciprocity, and Competition***by*Gary E Bolton & Axel Ockenfels**1833 The Equity Premium Puzzle and the Risk-Free Rate Puzzle***by*Phillippe Weil**1639 Finite automata play the repeated prisioners dilemma***by*Ariel Rubinstein**1631 The rule of information in bargaining: an experimental study***by*Alvin E Roth & J K Murnighan**1629 Toward a theory of bargaining: an experimental study in economics***by*Alvin E Roth**1594 Rational Expectations Equilibrium: Generic Existence and the Information Revealed by Prices***by*Roy Radner**1578 General Competitive Analysis in an Economy with Private Information***by*Edward C Prescott & Robert M Townsend**1560 Voting Behavior and Information Aggregation in Elections With Private Information***by*Timothy Feddersen & Wolfgang Pesendorfer**1544 Altruism, reputation and noise in linear public goods experiments***by*Thomas R Palfrey & Jeffrey E Prisbrey**1493 Risk Aversion and Bargaining: Some Preliminary Results***by*J K Murnighan & Alvin E Roth & Francoise Schoumaker**1460 Predation, reputation , and entry deterrence***by*Paul Milgrom & John Roberts**1406 Comparison of different Stackelberg solutions in a deterministic dynamic pollution control***by*Thomas Vallée**1403 Private Experience in Adaptive Learning Models***by*Felipe Perez**1265 Bandwagon effects and long run technology choice***by*Michihiro Kandori & Rafael Rob**1256 Private observation and Communication and Collusion***by*Michihiro Kandori & Hitoshi Matsushima**1225 Tacit coordination games, strategic uncertainty, and coordination failure***by*John B Van Huyck & Raymond C Battalio & Richard O Beil**1205 Moral Hazard and Observability***by*Bengt Holmstrom**1175 Games with incomplete information played by "bayesian" players***by*John C Harsanyi**1160 Ultimatum bargaining behavior: a survey and comparison of experimental results***by*Werner Guth & Reinhard Tietz**1147 Noncooperative Collusion Under Imperfect Price Information***by*Edward J Green & Robert H Porter**1115 An Introduction to General Equilibrium with Incomplete Asset Markets***by*John Geanakoplos**1009 Is the Corner Electronics Store Violationg the Antitrust Laws? (or Why the Good Guys Aren't)***by*Aaron S. Edlin**1000 A Folk Theorem for Stochastic Games***by*Prajit K. Dutta

### 1996

**624 The Theory of Learning in Games***by*Drew Fudenberg & David K. Levine**59 Balanced-Budget Mechanisms with Incomplete Information***by*Drew Fudenberg & David K. Levine & Eric Maskin**548 On the Evolution of Convention: Evidence from Coordination Games***by*J. Van Huyck & R. Battalio & F. Rankin**470 Consistency and Cautious Fictitious Play***by*Drew Fudenberg & David K. Levine**370 Measuring Subject’s Losses in Experimental Games***by*Drew Fudenberg & David K. Levine**2059 An Easier Way to Calibrate***by*Drew Fudenberg & David K. Levine**2022 Reputation and Distribution in a Gift Giving Game***by*David K. Levine**2015 Maintaining a Reputation against a Patient Opponent***by*Marco Celentani & Drew Fudenberg & David K. Levine & Wolfgang Pesendorfer**1954 Debt Constraints and Equilibrium in Infinite Horizon Economies with Incomplete Markets***by*David K. Levine & William Zame**180 When are Non-Anonymous Players Negligible***by*Drew Fudenberg & David K. Levine & Wolfgang Pesendorfer

### 1995

**96 When Are Agents Negligible?***by*David K. Levine & Wolfgang Pesendorfer**103 Reputation and Equilibrium Selection in Games with a Patient Player***by*Drew Fudenberg & David K. Levine

### 1994

**627 Efficiency and Observability with Long-Run and Short-Run Players***by*D. Fudenberg & D. K. Levine**394 The Folk Theorem with Imperfect Public Information***by*Drew Fudenberg & David K. Levine & Eric Maskin**2058 The Folk Theorem with Imperfect Public Information***by*Drew Fudenberg & David K. Levine & Eric Maskin

### 1993

**373 Steady State Learning and Nash Equilibrium***by*Drew Fudenberg & David K. Levine**2147 Self-Confirming Equilibrium***by*Drew Fudenberg & David K. Levine**189 Trembling Invisible Hand Equilibrium***by*David K. Levine**1276 Debt Constrained Asset Markets***by*Timothy J Kehoe & David K Levine**122247000000001088 Global Games and Equilibrium Selection***by*Hans Carlsson & Eric van Damme

### 1992

**2035 The Optimum Quantity of Money Revisited***by*Timothy J. Kehoe & David K. Levine & Michael Woodford**124 On Characterizing Equilibria of Models with Externalities and Taxes as Solutions to Optimization Problems***by*Timothy J. Kehoe & David K. Levine & Paul Romer

### 1991

**607 An Approximate Folk Theorem with Imperfect Private Information***by*D. Fudenberg & D. K. Levine**43 Asset Trading Mechanisms and Expansionary Policy***by*David K. Levine**2057 Gross Substitutes in Large Square Economics***by*Timothy J. Kehoe & David K. Levine & Andreu Mas-Colell & Michael Woodford

### 1990

**622 Decentralized Trading, Strategic Behaviour and the Walrasian Outcome***by*Arial Rubinstein & Asher Wolinsky**2193 The Economics of Indeterminacy in Overlapping Generations Models***by*Timothy J. Kehoe & David K. Levine**2082 Long Waves and Short Waves: Growth Through Intensive and Extensive Search***by*Boyan Jovanovic & Rafael Rob**2042 Indeterminacy in Applied Intertemporal General Equilibrium Models***by*Timothy J. Kehoe & David K. Levine**165 Determinacy of Equilibrium in Dynamic Models with Finitely Many Consumers***by*Timothy J. Kehoe & David K. Levine & Paul Romer**1397 Habit formation: a resolution of the equity premium puzzle***by*G. Constantinides

### 1989

**7662 Subjective Probability and Expected Utility without Additivity***by*David Schmeidler**52 Steady States and Determinacy in Economies with Infinitely Lived Agents***by*Timothy J. Kehoe & David K. Levine & Paul Romer**508 Reputation and Equilibrium Selection in Games with a Patient Player***by*D. Fudenberg & David K. Levine**49 Infinite Horizon Equilibrium with Incomplete Markets***by*David K. Levine**46 Determinacy of Equilibrium in Large Square Economies***by*Timothy J. Kehoe & David K. Levine & Andreu Mas-Colell & William Zame**2161 Efficiency and the Value of Money***by*David K. Levine**201 Reputation in Bargaining and Durable Goods Monopoly***by*Larry M. Ausubel & Raymond J. Deneckere

### 1988

**227 On the Robustness of Equilibrium Refinements***by*Drew Fudenberg & David Kreps & David K. Levine**221 Open and Closed-Loop Equilibria in Dynamic Games With Many Players***by*Drew Fudenberg & David K. Levine

### 1987

**229 Incomplete Information Bargaining with Outside Opportunities***by*Drew Fudenberg & David K. Levine & Jean Tirole**2172 Nash Equilibria Equal Competitive Equilibria***by*David K. Levine

### 1986

**220 Limit Games and Limit Equilibria***by*Drew Fudenberg & David K. Levine**1997 Reverse Regressions for Latent Variable Models***by*David K. Levine

### 1985

**86 Estatica comparativa y prevision perfecta en economias con horizonte infinito***by*Timothy J. Kehoe & David K. Levine**84 A Simple Durable Goods Model***by*David K. Levine**623 Equilibrium in a Market with Sequential Bargaining***by*Arial Rubinstein & Asher Wolinsky**48 Sensitivity of MLE to Measurement Error***by*David K. Levine**2005 The Financial Sector in the Planning of Economic Development***by*David Backus & Herminio Blanco & David K. Levine**1873 Comparative Statics and Perfect Foresight in Infinite Horizon Economies***by*Timothy J Kehoe & David K Levine**1098 Infinite-Horizon Models of Bargaining with One-Sided Incomplete Information***by*Drew Fudenberg & David K. Levine & Jean Tirole

### 1984

**2205 Strike Activity, Wage Settlements and Rationality***by*Drew Fudenberg & David K. Levine & Paul Ruud**2184 Regularity in Overlapping Generations Exchange Economies***by*Timothy J. Kehoe & David K. Levine**108 Intertemporal Separability in Overlapping Generations Models***by*Timothy J. Kehoe & David K. Levine

### 1983

**255 A Multi-stage Model of Bargaining***by*Joel Sobel & Takahashi**219 Subgame-Perfect Equilibria of Finite- and Infinite-Horizon Games***by*Drew Fudenberg & David K. Levine**176 A Remark on Serial Correlation in Maximum Likelihood***by*David K. Levine

### 1982

**7650 "Expected Utility" Analysis without the Independence Axiom***by*Mark J Machina

### 1979

**7656 Prospect Theory: An Analysis of Decision under Risk***by*Amos Tversky & Daniel Kahneman

### 1978

**625018000000000009 Temporal Resolution of Uncertainty and Dynamic Choice Theory***by*David M Kreps & Evan L Porteus

### 1969

**604 Reputation and Simultaneous Opponents***by*D. Fudenberg & D. M. Kreps**422 An Iterative Method of Solving a Game***by*J. Robinson