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Sampling Equilibrium with an Application to Strategic Voting

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  • Martin Osborne
  • Ariel Rubinstein

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Paper provided by David K. Levine in its series Levine's Working Paper Archive with number 506439000000000037.

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Date of creation: 19 Sep 2002
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Handle: RePEc:cla:levarc:506439000000000037

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References

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  1. Osborne, M-J & Rubinstein, A, 1997. "Games with Procedurally Rational Players," Papers 4-97, Tel Aviv.
  2. McKelvey, Richard D. & Ordeshook, Peter C., 1985. "Elections with limited information: A fulfilled expectations model using contemporaneous poll and endorsement data as information sources," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 36(1), pages 55-85, June.
  3. David P. Myatt, 2000. "The New Theory of Strategic Voting," Econometric Society World Congress 2000 Contributed Papers 1586, Econometric Society.
  4. McKelvey Richard D. & Palfrey Thomas R., 1995. "Quantal Response Equilibria for Normal Form Games," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 10(1), pages 6-38, July.
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Cited by:
  1. Ariel Rubinstein & Rani Spiegler, 2005. "Money Pumps in the Market," Levine's Bibliography 122247000000000941, UCLA Department of Economics.
  2. J. Atsu Amegashie, 2005. "Signaling In A Dynamic Contest With Boundedly Rational Players," Working Papers 0510, University of Guelph, Department of Economics and Finance.
  3. Sandholm, William H. & Tercieux, Olivier & Oyama, Daisuke, 0. "Sampling best response dynamics and deterministic equilibrium selection," Theoretical Economics, Econometric Society.
  4. Markus Haavio & Kaisa Kotakorpi, 2009. "The Political Economy of Sin Taxes," CESifo Working Paper Series 2650, CESifo Group Munich.
  5. Ran Spiegler, 2006. "The Market for Quacks," Review of Economic Studies, Oxford University Press, vol. 73(4), pages 1113-1131.

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