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Evolutionary Stability and Lexographic Preferences

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  • Larry Samuelson
  • Jeroen Swinkels

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Paper provided by David K. Levine in its series Levine's Working Paper Archive with number 506439000000000456.

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Date of creation: 14 Mar 2003
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Handle: RePEc:cla:levarc:506439000000000456

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  1. Binmore, K. & Samuelson, L., 1991. "Evolutionary Stability in Repeated games Played by Finite Automata," Papers, Michigan - Center for Research on Economic & Social Theory 90-17, Michigan - Center for Research on Economic & Social Theory.
  2. Abreu, Dilip & Rubinstein, Ariel, 1988. "The Structure of Nash Equilibrium in Repeated Games with Finite Automata," Econometrica, Econometric Society, Econometric Society, vol. 56(6), pages 1259-81, November.
  3. Binmore, Kenneth G. & Samuelson, Larry, 1992. "Evolutionary stability in repeated games played by finite automata," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, Elsevier, vol. 57(2), pages 278-305, August.
  4. Volij, Oscar, 2002. "In Defense of DEFECT," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, Elsevier, vol. 39(2), pages 309-321, May.
  5. Rubinstein, Ariel, 1986. "Finite automata play the repeated prisoner's dilemma," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, Elsevier, vol. 39(1), pages 83-96, June.
  6. Cooper, David J., 1996. "Supergames Played by Finite Automata with Finite Costs of Complexity in an Evolutionary Setting," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, Elsevier, vol. 68(1), pages 266-275, January.
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Cited by:
  1. repec:dgr:uvatin:2012089 is not listed on IDEAS
  2. repec:dgr:uvatin:2007115 is not listed on IDEAS
  3. Yuval Heller, 2014. "Language, Meaning, and Games: A Model of Communication, Coordination, and Evolution: Comment," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, American Economic Association, vol. 104(6), pages 1857-63, June.
  4. Stefano Demichelis & Jorgen W. Weibull, 2008. "Language, Meaning, and Games: A Model of Communication, Coordination, and Evolution," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, American Economic Association, vol. 98(4), pages 1292-1311, September.
  5. Luciano Andreozzi, 2010. "Trust is bound to emerge (In the repeated Trust Game)," Department of Economics Working Papers, Department of Economics, University of Trento, Italia 1008, Department of Economics, University of Trento, Italia.
  6. Heller, Yuval, 2013. "Language, Meaning, and Games: Comment," MPRA Paper 49375, University Library of Munich, Germany.
  7. Matthijs van Veelen, 2007. "Evolution of Strategies in Repeated Games with Discounting," Tinbergen Institute Discussion Papers 06-115/1, Tinbergen Institute.
  8. Shahi, Chander & Kant, Shashi, 2007. "An evolutionary game-theoretic approach to the strategies of community members under Joint Forest Management regime," Forest Policy and Economics, Elsevier, Elsevier, vol. 9(7), pages 763-775, April.
  9. Demichelis, Stefano & Weibull, Jörgen, 2006. "Efficiency, communication and honesty," Working Paper Series in Economics and Finance 645, Stockholm School of Economics, revised 28 Nov 2006.
  10. Andreozzi, Luciano, 2013. "Evolutionary stability in repeated extensive games played by finite automata," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, Elsevier, vol. 79(C), pages 67-74.
  11. repec:dgr:uvatin:2006115 is not listed on IDEAS

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