Evolutionary Stability and Lexographic Preferences
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Bibliographic InfoPaper provided by David K. Levine in its series Levine's Working Paper Archive with number 506439000000000456.
Date of creation: 14 Mar 2003
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Other versions of this item:
- Samuelson, Larry & Swinkels, Jeroen M., 2003. "Evolutionary stability and lexicographic preferences," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 44(2), pages 332-342, August.
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