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In Defense of DEFECT

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  • Volij, Oscar

Abstract

The one-state machine that always defects is the only evolutionarily stable strategy in the machine game that is derived from the prisoners' dilemma, when preferences are lexicographic in complexity. This machine is the only stochastically stable strategy of the machine game when players are restricted to choosing machines with a uniformly bounded complexity.

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File URL: http://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/B6WFW-45P0F0D-7/2/8a0d7205625a7c0bf38784d7b5aa1981
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Bibliographic Info

Article provided by Elsevier in its journal Games and Economic Behavior.

Volume (Year): 39 (2002)
Issue (Month): 2 (May)
Pages: 309-321

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Handle: RePEc:eee:gamebe:v:39:y:2002:i:2:p:309-321

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Web page: http://www.elsevier.com/locate/inca/622836

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References

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  1. Fudenberg, Drew & Maskin, Eric, 1990. "Evolution and Cooperation in Noisy Repeated Games," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, American Economic Association, vol. 80(2), pages 274-79, May.
  2. J Bergin & B L Lipman, 1997. "Evolution with state-dependent Mutations," Levine's Working Paper Archive 771, David K. Levine.
  3. M. Kandori & G. Mailath & R. Rob, 1999. "Learning, Mutation and Long Run Equilibria in Games," Levine's Working Paper Archive 500, David K. Levine.
  4. Young H. P., 1993. "An Evolutionary Model of Bargaining," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, Elsevier, vol. 59(1), pages 145-168, February.
  5. Ariel Rubinstein, 1997. "Finite automata play the repeated prisioners dilemma," Levine's Working Paper Archive 1639, David K. Levine.
  6. Young, H Peyton, 1993. "The Evolution of Conventions," Econometrica, Econometric Society, Econometric Society, vol. 61(1), pages 57-84, January.
  7. Binmore, Kenneth G. & Samuelson, Larry, 1992. "Evolutionary stability in repeated games played by finite automata," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, Elsevier, vol. 57(2), pages 278-305, August.
  8. Abreu, Dilip & Rubinstein, Ariel, 1988. "The Structure of Nash Equilibrium in Repeated Games with Finite Automata," Econometrica, Econometric Society, Econometric Society, vol. 56(6), pages 1259-81, November.
  9. Cooper, David J., 1996. "Supergames Played by Finite Automata with Finite Costs of Complexity in an Evolutionary Setting," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, Elsevier, vol. 68(1), pages 266-275, January.
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Cited by:
  1. Maenner, Eliot, 2008. "Adaptation and complexity in repeated games," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, Elsevier, vol. 63(1), pages 166-187, May.
  2. Andreozzi, Luciano, 2013. "Evolutionary stability in repeated extensive games played by finite automata," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, Elsevier, vol. 79(C), pages 67-74.
  3. Samuelson, Larry & Swinkels, Jeroen M., 2003. "Evolutionary stability and lexicographic preferences," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, Elsevier, vol. 44(2), pages 332-342, August.
  4. Pedro Dal Bo & Guillaume R. Frochette, 2011. "The Evolution of Cooperation in Infinitely Repeated Games: Experimental Evidence," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, American Economic Association, vol. 101(1), pages 411-29, February.

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