Strategies That Work When Property Rights Don't
AbstractIn many sectors property rights over knowledge and information are weak as they are embodied in employees, competitors can copy or customers can pirate. Yet comprehensive studies show that firms systematically invest in these assets. We offer a simple taxonomy of strategies that firms use to cope with weak property rights. We classify these strategies in three groups: (i) Some firms threaten offenders with strong competition. (ii) Other firms exploit complementarities and offer potential offenders a better deal than they can get elsewhere. (iii) And yet other firms exploit weak property rights and make profits on complementary assets or products that they can own. We go beyond taxonomy by showing when a particular strategy works. It depends systematically on the characteristics of both the asset and the investing firm.
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Bibliographic InfoPaper provided by David K. Levine in its series Levine's Working Paper Archive with number 618897000000000518.
Date of creation: 31 Oct 2003
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- NEP-ALL-2003-11-03 (All new papers)
- NEP-COM-2003-11-03 (Industrial Competition)
- NEP-INO-2003-11-03 (Innovation)
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- NEP-TID-2003-11-03 (Technology & Industrial Dynamics)
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- Nancy Gallini & Suzanne Scotchmer, 2003.
"Intellectual Property: When is it the Best Incentive System?,"
Levine's Working Paper Archive
618897000000000532, David K. Levine.
- Nancy Gallini & Suzanne Scotchmer, 2002. "Intellectual Property: When Is It the Best Incentive System?," NBER Chapters, in: Innovation Policy and the Economy, Volume 2, pages 51-78 National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
- Nancy Gallini and Suzanne Scotchmer., 2001. "Intellectual Property: When Is It the Best Incentive System?," Economics Working Papers E01-303, University of California at Berkeley.
- Nancy Gallini & Suzanne Scotchmer, 2002. "Intellectual Property: When Is It the Best Incentive System?," Law and Economics 0201001, EconWPA.
- Gallini, Nancy & Scotchmer, Suzanne, 2001. "Intellectual Property: When Is It the Best Incentive System?," Department of Economics, Working Paper Series qt9wx2c2hz, Department of Economics, Institute for Business and Economic Research, UC Berkeley.
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