Signals, Evolution and the Explanatory Power of Transient Information

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Signals, Evolution and the Explanatory Power of Transient Information

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Brian Skyrms

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Paper provided by David K. Levine in its series Levine's Working Paper Archive with number 618897000000000799.

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Date of creation: 30 Apr 2003
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Handle: RePEc:cla:levarc:618897000000000799

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This paper has been announced in the following NEP Reports:

NEP-ALL-2004-05-02 (All new papers)
NEP-EVO-2004-05-02 (Evolutionary Economics)
NEP-PKE-2004-05-02 (Post Keynesian Economics)

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Warneryd Karl, 1993. "Cheap Talk, Coordination, and Evolutionary Stability," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 5(4), pages 532-546, October. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
Warneryd, Karl, 1991. "Evolutionary stability in unanimity games with cheap talk," Economics Letters, Elsevier, vol. 36(4), pages 375-378, August. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
Van Huyck, John, et al, 1995. "On the Origin of Convention: Evidence from Symmetric Bargaining Games," International Journal of Game Theory, Springer, vol. 24(2), pages 187-212.
Robson, A.J., 1989. "Efficiency In Evolutionary Games: Darwin, Nash And Secret Handshake," Papers 89-22, Michigan - Center for Research on Economic & Social Theory.
Karl H. Schlag, 1994. "When Does Evolution Lead to Efficiency in Communication Games?," Discussion Paper Serie B 299, University of Bonn, Germany. [Downloadable!]
Other versions:
- Karl H. Schlag, . "When Does Evolution Lead to Efficiency in Communication Games?," ELSE working papers 026, ESRC Centre on Economics Learning and Social Evolution. [Downloadable!]
Schlag,Karl, . "Cheap talk and evolutionary dynamics," Discussion Paper Serie B 242, University of Bonn, Germany.
Joel Sobel, 1993. "Evolutionary Stability and Efficiency," University of California at San Diego, Economics Working Paper Series 93-17, Department of Economics, UC San Diego.
Other versions:
- Sobel, Joel, 1993. "Evolutionary stability and efficiency," Economics Letters, Elsevier, vol. 42(2-3), pages 301-312. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
Bhaskar, V., 1998. "Noisy Communication and the Evolution of Cooperation," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 82(1), pages 110-131, September. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
Kim, Yong-Gwan & Sobel, Joel, 1995. "An Evolutionary Approach to Pre-play Communication," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 63(5), pages 1181-93, September. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
Other versions:
- Yong Gwan Kim & Joel Sobel, 1992. "An Evolutionary Approach to Pre-Play Communication," University of California at San Diego, Economics Working Paper Series 92-01, Department of Economics, UC San Diego.
- Kim, Y.G. & Sobel, J., 1993. "An Evolutionary Approach to Pre-Play Communication," Working Papers 93-02, University of Iowa, Department of Economics.
Banerjee, Abhijit & Weibull, Jorgen W., 2000. "Neutrally Stable Outcomes in Cheap-Talk Coordination Games," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 32(1), pages 1-24, July. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
Other versions:
- Abhijit Banerjee & Jörgen W. Weibull, . "Neutrally Stable Outcomes in Cheap Talk Coordination Games," ELSE working papers 012, ESRC Centre on Economics Learning and Social Evolution.
Blume Andreas & Kim Yong-Gwan & Sobel Joel, 1993. "Evolutionary Stability in Games of Communication," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 5(4), pages 547-575, October. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
Other versions:
- Blume, A. & Kim, Y.G. & Sobel, J., 1992. "Evolutionary Stability in Games of Communication," Working Papers 92-17, University of Iowa, Department of Economics.
- Andreas Blume & Yong-Gwan Kim & Joel Sobel, 1992. "Evolutionary Stability in Games of Communication," University of California at San Diego, Economics Working Paper Series 92-29, Department of Economics, UC San Diego.
- Blume, A. & Kim, Y.G. & Sobel, J., 1993. "Evolutionary Stability in Games of Communication," Working Papers 93-07, University of Iowa, Department of Economics.
Crawford, Vincent P & Sobel, Joel, 1982. "Strategic Information Transmission," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 50(6), pages 1431-51, November. [Downloadable!] (restricted)

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